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Abstract
Since the underlying qualities of products and firms are not readily apparent, information
asymmetry exists at the heart of marketing. This dissertation investigates information asymmetry
that is present specifically between: (1) firms and consumers, and (2) firms and investors. I
advance our knowledge of how information asymmetry can be reduced in beneficial ways for the
firm either by voluntary or involuntary means. This dissertation consists of two essays. In Essay
1, I examine involuntary information leakage in the movie industry. I find that spoilers, which
prematurely resolve plot uncertainty for those who have yet to see the movie, can increase box
office revenues for movie studios. The positive spoiling effect is driven by uncertainty reduction,
in which spoilers provide diagnostic information to consumers unsure about the quality of a
movie. In Essay 2, I examine voluntary information leakage in the context of firm signaling. As
investors do not have access to private information and cannot observe firm activities such as
innovation projects and corporate policy changes, firms send signals to investors that provide
cues to such information. I find that data breaches previously experienced by firms can serve as
information that negatively influences the interpretation of otherwise positive signals. Taken
together, this dissertation outlines implications for firms to effectively respond to and manage
information asymmetry in the marketplace.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This dissertation examines the imbalance of information that is present between two parties
within a transaction. Because the true qualities of products and firms are not readily apparent,
consumers and investors rely on information in their environment to make better decisions. I
specifically examine the information imbalance between: (1) firms and consumers, and (2) firms
and investors, in the contexts of movies and signaling respectively. In Essay 1, I find that spoiler
reviews can increase box office revenues of movie studios because spoilers provide helpful
information to consumers who are unsure about the quality of a movie. In Essay 2, I find that
when firms provide cues to investors who are unsure about the quality of firms that are worth
investing in, data breaches can serve as information that influences the interpretation of positive
cues to have more negative meanings. This dissertation then outlines recommendations for firms
to effectively manage these voluntary and involuntary leakages of information in the
marketplace.
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1. On Information Asymmetry
1.1 Introduction
Information asymmetry is fundamentally concerned with the imbalance of information between
two parties in a transaction. Simply, one party may be aware of things that the other party may
not be. This seemingly intuitive statement creates non-obvious complications and costs for both
parties within the transaction. Previous research makes the theoretical distinction between
information about quality, and information about intent (Connelly et al. 2011; Stiglitz 2000).
Information about intent is often conceptualized in a principal-agent relationship, in which the
principal may not be aware of the agent’s behaviors or intentions (Connelly et al. 2011). This
subsequently leads to problems associated with differing incentives and moral hazards. However,
the main focus of this dissertation is on information about quality.
Information about quality deals with the fact that it is difficult to observe the true
qualities of products and firms. Granted perfect information, individuals could easily optimize
their decision-making processes. For example, a consumer could select from an assortment the
product that provides the best fit, and an investor could purchase shares of only high-performing
firms over low-performing firms to maximize returns. However, the lack of perfect information
constrains consumers and investors alike to make decisions based primarily on public
information, unable to access private information firms hold that may be diagnostic of quality.
The objective of this dissertation is to explore how leakages of private information to the public,
either by voluntary or involuntary means, benefit the firm.
Essay 1 examines involuntary information leakage between firms and consumers in the
movie industry. Although advertising can be used by movie studios as a direct means to
1

communicate information to consumers about movie quality, online word-of-mouth (WOM) can
serve as an alternative trustworthy source of information (Mudambi and Schuff 2010). For
example, potential moviegoers can read online reviews written by consumers who have already
seen the movie in theaters to make more informed purchase decisions. An industry concern for
movie studios is that online WOM often contain spoilers, which give away important plot details.
On the one hand, the leakage of plot details can serve to reduce information asymmetry between
movie studios and potential moviegoers about movie quality. On the other hand, spoilers can
remove the elements of suspense and surprise from the movie, potentially harming box office
revenue.
Essay 2 examines voluntary information leakage between firms and investors in the
signaling context. Investors seek high-quality firms to maximize their investment returns.
However, public information alone may be insufficient to clearly distinguish between highquality and low-quality firms. In order to maximize shareholder value, high-quality firms are
incentivized to voluntarily signal their unobservable characteristics to investors. For example, in
order to signal to investors about the progress of an unobservable innovation project, the firm can
issue related patent announcements. Since patent announcements are public information,
investors may observe the signals and then interpret that the firm will be more competitive in the
future when the innovation project is commercialized. This results in positive financial returns
from the patent announcements for the firm (Sood and Tellis 2009). This essay examines how a
negative event experienced by the firm can influence its investors’ interpretations of subsequent
signals. Specifically, I examine how the financial returns from patent announcements and
executive hiring decisions, which are in themselves positive signals to investors, are negatively
impacted by prior data breaches.
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The central theme that weaves the two essays in this dissertation together is that reduction
of information asymmetry, either by voluntary or involuntary information leakages, can be
beneficial for the firm. This dissertation investigates the behavioral mechanism and moderators
that can specifically guide how firms can respond to and manage information leakages more
effectively. Next, I provide an overview for each essay.

1.2 Firms and Consumers in the Movie Industry
Movies continue to be a popular form of entertainment for consumers. The total box office
revenues accrued in North America in 2018 were $11.89 billion USD, a 7.4% increase from the
year prior (Statista 2021a). The closure of theaters due to the recent COVID-19 pandemic have
merely shifted the mode of movie consumption to streaming services. It is projected that the
revenues from video streaming services will reach $35 billion USD by the end of 2021, and
experience an annual growth rate of 9.6% moving forward (Statista 2021b).
Essay 1 examines in this context the information asymmetry that is present between
movie studios and potential moviegoers. Movies are experiential products that can be
characterized by high subjective quality (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Wilcox, Roggeveen,
and Grewal 2011). As a result, the true quality of movies is difficult to ascertain by consumers
prior to actual movie consumption. To reduce the information asymmetry and attract a bigger
audience, movie studios that release high-quality movies spend heavily on advertising, which can
serve as a credible signal of quality to consumers (Basuroy, Desai, and Talukdar 2006; Milgrom
and Roberts 1986). Basuroy, Desai, and Talukdar (2006) argue that it is difficult for movie
studios that release low-quality movies to similarly spend heavily on advertising because low-

3

quality movies can generate negative WOM that damages the movie studios’ reputation, leading
to long-term harms.
In addition to advertising, potential moviegoers have access to online WOM as an
additional source of movie information. Accordingly, previous research finds that online WOM
has a positive effect on box office revenue by increasing the awareness of the movie, and
decreasing the uncertainty related to the movie’s quality (Liu 2006; Chintagunta, Gopinath, and
Venkataraman 2010). However, it is difficult for movie studios to control the content of online
WOM relative to advertising. This highlights an industry concern for movie studios that online
WOM often contains spoilers.
Spoilers are defined as information that prematurely resolves plot uncertainty for those
who have yet to see the movie. The research question that drives this essay is whether spoiler
reviews are beneficial or harmful to the box office revenues of movie studios. Since spoiler
reviews reveal plot-related information as justifications when critiquing a movie, potential
moviegoers can have access to diagnostic information about movie quality. However, plot
uncertainty, which stimulates tension and suspense, serves as an important source of utility in
story consumption (Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica 2015). For example, consumers often become
emotionally invested in the protagonist as the movie unfolds, and the protagonist’s uncertain fate
as the movie reaches its climax creates suspense that causes consumers to yearn for its resolution
(Zillmann 1995). By prematurely removing the elements of suspense and surprise, spoilers can
reduce expected enjoyment and discourage theater visits.
Essay 1 addresses this question by assembling a data set of 140,869 reviews for 993
movies released in the United States between January 2013 and December 2017. A conceptual
background of spoilers is developed, along with the properties of metrics necessary to measure
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the spoiling content of movie reviews. After developing an appropriate spoiler intensity metric,
this essay demonstrates a positive association between spoiler reviews and box office revenue,
and further provides evidence that uncertainty reduction is responsible for the positive spoiling
effect. Managerial implications of how movie marketers can respond to spoiler reviews, and how
review platforms that display spoiler reviews can potentially increase consumer welfare are
discussed.

1.3 Firms and Investors in the Signaling Context
It is in the interests of high-quality firms to distinguish themselves from low-quality firms to
maximize shareholder value. In order to reduce the information asymmetry present between
firms and investors, firms can voluntarily send signals that provide information or cues regarding
their unobservable characteristics (Connelly et al. 2011). For example, although information
regarding an innovation project is private information that is inaccessible by most investors, the
firm can use patent announcements to publicly signal the innovation project’s progress. This
framework based on signaling has been applied by previous research to explain various strategic
firm behaviors, from advertising to firm alliance announcements, that voluntarily reduce
information asymmetry to increase financial returns (Kim and McAlister 2011; Swaminathan
and Moorman 2009).
Essay 2 explores how signals, which otherwise lead to positive financial returns, are
affected by unanticipated firm events. This essay specifically examines data breaches, which is
defined as the disclosure of private and confidential information to an unauthorized party. A
notorious example is Equifax, which in 2017 experienced a data breach perpetrated by a hacker
that stole personal data, including the names, addresses, and Social Security numbers, of more
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than 147 million Americans. A survey of IT professionals reveals that more than 90 percent of
firms have experienced some form of threat to their data security (Kaspersky Lab 2015).
Furthermore, it is estimated that the average cost of data breaches in the United States is $8.64
million, which is increasing annually (Ponemon Institute 2020; Berinato and Perry 2018). This
research demonstrates that such a detrimental event can have both direct and indirect
consequences, which negatively influence the interpretation of firm signals and decrease their
financial returns. Drawing from signaling theory, this essay proposes that data breaches lead to
signal calibration, which can be defined as the change in degree of valance associated with a
signal due to information present in the external environment. I construct a matched data set of
135 data breach disclosures, 6,541 patent announcements, and 228 executive hiring decisions in
the financial and insurance services industry between January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2018, to
demonstrate that recency and attribution of the data breach, and reputation of the firm are
responsible for the moderation of financial returns.
This essay contributes to the extant literature by documenting both the direct and indirect
financial harm of data breaches. From this, the research provides implications for firms that have
previously experienced a data breach to optimize their shareholder value by adjusting their
signaling routines.
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2. Do Spoilers Really Spoil? Using Topic Modeling to Measure the
Effect of Spoiler Reviews on Box Office Revenue
2.1 Abstract
A sizable portion of online movie reviews contains spoilers, defined as information that
prematurely resolves plot uncertainty. In this research, the authors study the consequences of
spoiler reviews using data on box office revenue and online word of mouth for movies released
in the United States between January 2013 and December 2017. To capture the degree of
information in spoiler review text that reduces plot uncertainty, the authors propose a spoiler
intensity metric and measure it using a correlated topic model. Using a dynamic panel model
with movie fixed effects and instrumental variables, the authors find a significant and positive
relationship between spoiler intensity and box office revenue with an elasticity of .06. The
positive effect of spoiler intensity is more prominent for movies with limited release, smaller
advertising spending, and moderate user ratings, and is stronger in earlier days after the movie’s
release. These findings are consistent with the mechanism that more intense spoiler reviews can
help consumers reduce their uncertainty about the quality of the movie and therefore encourage
theater visits. By studying an exogenous update that changed the display of movie reviews on an
online review platform, the authors provide further evidence in support of the uncertaintyreduction mechanism of spoiler reviews. Results from this study suggest that movie studios can
benefit from consumers’ access to plot-intense reviews, and should actively monitor the content
of spoiler reviews to better forecast box office performance.
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2.2 Introduction
In April 2019, the directors of Avengers: Endgame issued a stern warning to fans about the
much-anticipated blockbuster film: “When you see Endgame in the coming weeks, please don’t
spoil it for others, the same way you wouldn’t want it spoiled for you” (Kooser 2019). As a
marketing tactic, this ploy was successful, generating significant buzz on social media. However,
the directors’ true intention behind their statement remains ambiguous. Did they truly want to
silence viewers? What is the relationship between spoilers and box office revenue? Should
movie studios be concerned about the exchange of spoilers among consumers? Extant marketing
research is unequivocal that online word of mouth (WOM) is vital for the financial success of
new products such as movies (e.g., Babić Rosario et al. 2016; Kerrigan 2017). However, the
understanding of spoilers and how they influence consumer purchase decisions is still limited.
In the context of movies, a spoiler review refers to a movie review that contains spoilers,
and a non-spoiler review refers to a movie review without any spoilers, where a “spoiler” is
defined as information that prematurely resolves plot uncertainty for those who have yet to see
the movie. According to data from Internet Movie Database (IMDb), approximately 93% of
movies released between January 2013 and December 2017 in the United States garnered at least
one spoiler review throughout their screenings and approximately 31% of total movie reviews
contained spoilers, suggesting the prevalence of spoiler reviews in the movie industry. With the
growth of social media, spoiler reviews can spread rapidly throughout the Internet to reach a
broad audience. Conventional wisdom suggests a negative relationship between spoiler reviews
and consumer demand, as exemplified by the concern raised by the directors of Avengers:
Endgame. However, previous research has shown either mixed or null effect of spoilers on
consumer behavior (Johnson and Rosenbaum 2015; Leavitt and Christenfeld 2011). Thus, the
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prevalence of spoilers in the movie industry and its unclear ramifications call for a deeper
understanding of whether and how spoiler reviews affect consumers’ moviegoing decisions—
questions we attempt to address in this research.
We provide a conceptual discussion of spoilers which guides the development of spoiler
intensity, defined as the degree of information in spoiler reviews that reduces plot uncertainty.
Although previous marketing research has examined the relationship between consumer demand
and various aspects of online WOM, such as volume (Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Liu 2006),
valence (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Chintagunta, Gopinath, and Venkataraman 2010; Moon,
Bergey, and Iacobucci 2010), and variance (Sun 2012), most studies have not considered the
information within review content beyond the sentiment. Unlike spoiler volume, spoiler intensity
is a latent construct that needs to be inferred from review text. In this study, we use a correlated
topic model (CTM; Blei and Lafferty 2005) to identify key topics in movie reviews and propose
a spoiler intensity metric as a function of these topics.
We assemble a data set of 140,869 reviews for 993 movies released in the United States
between January 2013 and December 2017. We collect both spoiler and non-spoiler reviews
from IMDb and exploit the review platform’s spoiler labels for movie reviews as a training
sample to identify topics that are more likely to appear in spoiler than non-spoiler reviews, which
we then use in the construction of the spoiler intensity metric. Using a dynamic panel model with
movie fixed effects, we quantify the association between spoiler reviews and box office revenue.
We alleviate the potential endogeneity concern arising from the inclusion of WOM-related
variables and marketing mix variables using instrumental variables (IV). We find that the spoiler
intensity of a movie is positively associated with subsequent box office revenue, whereas the
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association between spoiler volume and subsequent box office revenue is not evident. We also
provide evidence that these findings are robust to alternative specifications of spoiler intensity.
We further investigate the behavioral mechanism that may drive the positive relationship
between spoiler intensity and demand. Moviegoers often visit online review platforms to seek
diagnostic information from their peers and resolve uncertainty about movie quality (Dellarocas
2003; Goh, Heng, and Lin 2013). Unlike non-spoiler reviews, spoiler reviews can reveal plotrelated information as justifications when critiquing a movie and therefore tend to be more
diagnostic for potential moviegoers. As such, we expect that the diagnostic value of spoiler
reviews helps consumers reduce uncertainty about movie quality, which in turn encourages
theater visits. To test the uncertainty-reduction mechanism of spoiler reviews, we consider four
potential moderators of the effect of spoiler intensity: (i) release type (limited release vs. wide
release), (ii) movie age, (iii) advertising, and (iv) average user rating. We find that the positive
effect of spoiler intensity is larger for movies characterized by greater uncertainty for
moviegoers, such as limited release movies and movies with smaller advertising spending. In
addition, the effect of spoiler intensity decays over time, which is consistent with the higher
uncertainty at the earlier (rather than later) stages of a movie’s life cycle. We also find an
inverted-U relationship between average user ratings and the effect of spoiler intensity, which
suggests that the positive spoiling effect is stronger for movies that receive moderate or mixed
ratings compared to movies that receive extreme ratings (i.e., either very high or low). This
finding is likely driven by the fact that user ratings in the middle range tend to convey more
ambiguous signals about movie quality than extreme ratings (Tang, Fang, and Wang 2014).
Thus, potential consumers of movies with moderate user ratings have greater incentive to seek
diagnostic information to reduce their uncertainty about future consumption.

11

Moreover, we present additional evidence in support of the uncertainty-reduction
mechanism of spoiler reviews from an event study. In particular, we examine the change in the
effect of spoiler intensity on box office revenues after an exogenous update on the IMDb website
which increased both the cost of reading spoiler reviews and the diagnosticity of non-spoiler
reviews. If the uncertainty-reduction mechanism is indeed important, we would expect the
positive effect of spoiler intensity on demand to be weakened after the website update because of
the decrease in the relative diagnostic value, and the increase in the cost of reading spoiler
reviews. Our results from the event study are consistent with this expectation and therefore
provide additional support for the proposed mechanism.
With this research, we aim to make three contributions. First, we provide a conceptual
background of spoilers by formally defining what constitutes spoiling information in a movie
review and discussing several key properties that a spoiler intensity metric needs to capture.
Second, we make substantive contributions by showing a positive association between spoiler
reviews and consumer demand driven by spoiler intensity rather than spoiler volume.
Furthermore, we show that the effect of spoiler intensity is more prominent for movies with
limited release, smaller advertising spending, and moderate user ratings. The positive effect of
spoiler intensity is also stronger in earlier periods of a movie’s life cycle. Finally, we present data
patterns that support the behavioral mechanism that uncertainty reduction drives the positive
effect of spoiler intensity.

2.3 Related Literature
Given our focus on spoiler reviews, this research builds on the literature on online WOM. Extant
marketing research conceptualizes the influence of online WOM on demand through two distinct
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channels (e.g., Babić Rosario et al. 2016; Seiler, Yao, and Wang 2017): the informative effect of
online WOM involves increasing the awareness of consumers about the existence of a product
and providing information about the product that consumers seek and value; the persuasive effect
of online WOM involves increasing consumers’ appreciation for a product without delivering
specific product information. The informative role of online WOM is supported by the positive
relationship found between number of reviews and box office sales (Duan, Gu, and Whinston
2008; Liu 2006) and between the amount of online conversation and television ratings (Godes
and Mayzlin 2004). The persuasive effect of online WOM is supported by the positive
relationship found between valence (e.g., review ratings, sentiment) and demand (Chevalier and
Mayzlin 2006; Chintagunta, Gopinath, and Venkataraman 2010; Dellarocas, Zhang, and Awad
2007). Regarding the variance of online WOM, measured by the statistical dispersion of ratings,
previous findings are less consistent, in part because of the complex ways in which variance may
affect sales (Clemons, Gao, and Hitt 2006; Sun 2012).
In addition to the summary statistics of online WOM (e.g., ratings and volume),
marketing scholars have explored specific types and patterns of online WOM observed in the
movie industry. For example, Hennig-Thurau, Wiertz, and Feldhaus (2015) examine Twitter to
study the diagnostic value of microblogging WOM and find that negative tweets are potentially
harmful to a movie’s early box office revenue. Gelper, Peres, and Eliashberg (2018) note that
sporadic volume bursts, or spikes of online WOM prior to a movie’s release, are positively
associated with opening weekend box office revenue. Recently, a growing academic attention
has been paid to online WOM content beyond its overall valence. Gopinath, Thomas, and
Krishnamurthi (2014) use human coders to examine the attribute-, emotion-, and
recommendation-oriented dimensions of online WOM and find that only the valence of the
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recommendation-oriented dimensions impacts sales. Liu, Singh, and Srinivasan (2016) use the
principal components of words in tweets to show that the content of online WOM can
significantly increase the accuracy of predictions about television show ratings.
It is particularly important to account for the WOM content when examining the impact
of online WOM in the entertainment industry for at least two reasons. First, summary statistics
alone cannot provide a full picture. For instance, previous research has shown that review ratings
are subject to inflation (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006) and selection bias (Dellarocas 2003; Godes
and Silva 2012; Li and Hitt 2008), suggesting that ratings can sometimes be misleading in
signaling a movie’s true quality. Second, to minimize the risk of watching movies of poor
quality, potential moviegoers have incentives to read detailed content (Mudambi and Schuff
2010), especially content related to plots, to seek diagnostic information. We contribute to the
online WOM literature by presenting the first empirical study of the relationship between plotrelated WOM, which often appears in spoiler reviews, and consumer demand in the movie
industry.

2.4 Conceptual Discussion
What Are Spoilers?
Previous research in the field of literature finds that consumption of stories involves a
prospective orientation in the minds of consumers, related to forming predictions and looking
ahead to what will happen next in the plot (Olson, Mack, and Duffy 1981). As a result, plot
uncertainty, which stimulates tension and suspense, serves as an important source of utility in
story consumption (Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica 2015). For example, consumers often become
emotionally invested in the protagonist, who might encounter danger in a story, and the
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protagonist’s uncertain fate creates suspense that causes consumers to yearn for its resolution
(Zillmann 1995). In the context of movies, plot uncertainty can be resolved either by watching
the movie or by reading reviews that include plot-related information before the movie
consumption. We therefore define spoilers as information that prematurely resolves plot
uncertainty for those who have yet to see the movie.
Effect of Spoilers
Extant research in psychology and communication has revealed mixed findings regarding the
impact of spoilers on story enjoyment. By manipulating the types of short stories read by
subjects in laboratory conditions, Leavitt and Christenfeld (2011) find that spoilers can have a
positive effect on media enjoyment. The authors later explain this effect by the increased ease of
understanding the media experience due to spoilers, which frees cognitive resources and allows
consumers to enjoy media at a deeper level (Leavitt and Christenfeld 2013). In contrast, Johnson
and Rosenbaum (2015) find that spoiled stories are less fun and suspenseful when using a
multidimensional approach to measure enjoyment. They explain their findings using excitationtransfer theory (Zillmann, Hay, and Bryant 1975), positing that spoilers have a negative effect on
media enjoyment because they displace the physiological arousal generated by suspense that
should be resolved by media consumption.
The relationship between spoilers and consumer demand is arguably more relevant to
marketers. In contrast to the conventional knowledge that spoilers harm demand, Johnson and
Rosenbaum (2015) fail to find a significant effect of spoilers on media selection; when subjects
were presented with a choice between spoiled and unspoiled short stories, they were just as likely
to choose the spoiled stories as those unspoiled stories. However, the relationship between
spoiler reviews and movie demand has not yet been examined.
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On the one hand, spoiler reviews might discourage theater visits. By prematurely
revealing plot-related information, spoiler reviews can ruin the element of surprise in a movie
experience and consequently decrease consumption utility. Such a surprise-burst effect can be
triggered by different types of plot-related information of movies from different genres. For
example, the death of a character could be a surprising event for a dramatic movie, while the
proposal and marriage between characters could be the ultimate surprise for a romantic movie.
On the other hand, spoiler reviews might help consumers reduce the uncertainty about
product fit. Due to their subjective nature, the quality of experiential products such as movies is
difficult to evaluate by consumers prior to consumption (Alba and Williams 2013). By revealing
important plot details and increasing the informative value of WOM, spoiler reviews could have
a positive effect on movie demand. It is unclear whether this positive uncertainty-reduction effect
outweighs the negative surprise-burst effect of spoiler reviews in the movie industry. We seek to
extend the literature on spoilers by investigating the net effect of spoiler reviews on movie
demand, that is, the sum of the positive effect from uncertainty reduction and the negative effect
from the burst of surprise.
Definition and Properties of Spoiler Intensity
Studying the consequences of spoiler reviews requires measuring both the volume and intensity
of spoilers, where spoiler intensity is defined as the degree of information in spoiler reviews that
reduces plot uncertainty. Consider a movie that receives multiple spoiler reviews. Measuring
only the number of spoiler reviews is inadequate at capturing the spoiling effect because these
reviews may provide similar plot-related information and therefore do not accumulate in
resolving plot uncertainty. As such, spoiler intensity is an important construct that differs from
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spoiler volume. Below we present and explain several key properties that an adequate measure of
spoiler intensity should capture.
Property 1: Spoiler intensity should be a continuous rather than dichotomous variable
because the extent to which plot uncertainty is revolved depends on the level of details in a
spoiler review. For example, a spoiler review for the movie Avengers: End Game can reveal not
only the names of characters who died at the end (e.g., “Iron Man dies”), but also the causes and
consequences of the deaths (e.g., “Iron Man sacrifices himself to defeat Thanos”), which further
resolve plot uncertainty for consumers. Therefore, a dichotomous variable is insufficient to
capture the level of plot uncertainty prematurely resolved in a spoiler review.
Property 2: Spoiler intensity should capture a multitude of plot-related topics that are
involved in the structure of a story. Previous research suggests that stories in general share
similar patterns and plot structures, and stories in movies are no exception (Deighton, Romer,
and McQueen 1989). In particular, movie plots typically unfold in a three-act structure:
exposition, rising action, and climax (Trottier 1998), where exposition is used to introduce the
major characters, the rising action occurs when the protagonist encounters some sort of crisis that
creates tension, and the climax features the resolution of the main tensions of the story. For each
act, the screenwriter can craft the story using various elements, which we call plot-related topics
(e.g., topics related to “fight” often appear in the climax of action movies, while topics related to
“emotion” often appear in the climax of romantic movies). Because of the similar patterns and
structures of stories in the movie industry, we assume that a discrete number of plot-related
topics are conveyed by movie reviews.
Property 3: Spoiler intensity should allow for the degree of uncertainty resolved by the
same topic to vary across movies. For example, although both Avengers: End Game and The
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Lego Movie might include the topic of “survival,” the level of suspense resolved by reading plot
details related to the topic of “survival” in a spoiler review is likely to be greater for Avengers:
End Game than for The Lego Movie due to the overall storyline and the plot structure. Thus, an
adequate measure of spoiler intensity should account for the potential heterogeneity in each
topic’s contribution to resolve plot uncertainty across movies.
Property 4: Spoiler intensity should discount the degree of plot uncertainty resolved by a
certain topic that has appeared in previous reviews. This property captures the potential
dynamics in the spoiling process when a consumer reads multiple reviews. For instance, suppose
a consumer has already read several spoiler reviews. Three scenarios might occur when this
consumer reads a subsequent spoiler review. First, the new spoiler review includes information
of new plot-related topics that have not appeared in previous reviews. Given that a new facet of
plot uncertainty can be resolved by reading this new spoiler review, the degree of plot
uncertainty resolved by this additional spoiler review should not be discounted when assessing
the overall spoiler intensity of multiple reviews. Second, the new spoiler review includes
information on plot-related topics that have already appeared in previous reviews but provides
additional details for these existing topics. In this case, the degree of plot uncertainty pertaining
to existing topics is further resolved by this new spoiler review because of the additional
information provided. Third, the new spoiler review includes information on plot-related topics
that have appeared in previous reviews but does not provide any new information for these
existing topics. The contribution to the reduction of plot uncertainty by this new spoiler review
needs to be discounted because consumers’ feeling of suspense is still driven by previous
reviews.
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2.5 Setting and Data
We obtained a list of movies released in the United States between January 2013 and December
2017 from WildAboutMovies.com. From this list, we sampled 993 movies that have their daily
box office revenue data available on BoxOfficeMojo.com. We focus on the first eight weeks of
daily box office revenue because 97% of total box office revenue is accrued within the first eight
weeks of a movie’s release (Liu 2006). We collected daily box office revenue and daily number
of theaters, as well as other movie characteristics (e.g., Motion Picture Association of America
rating, genre, and release type) from both BoxOfficeMojo.com and IMDb. We matched our
movie sample with advertising spending data provided by Kantar Media.
We use IMDb to collect online WOM data for two reasons. First, IMDb is by far the most
popular online movie review platform in the United States.1 Second, IMDb requires users to
label their reviews as spoilers if a user believes that his or her review discloses any critical plot
elements of a movie. As Figure 1 shows, IMDb penalizes users who do not label spoiler reviews
by blacklisting their accounts and deleting their reviews automatically. This institutional feature
gives us a data set with a clear classification between spoiler and non-spoiler reviews.
Table 1 lists key time-varying variables in this study, along with their descriptions. Table 2
presents summary statistics of time-varying variables and time-invariant movie characteristics.
On average, each movie’s daily box office revenue was $1.04 million. Each movie received
approximately one spoiler review and two non-spoiler reviews per day.2 As Figure 2(a) shows,
both the volume of spoiler reviews and the volume of total reviews grow over time, though with
greater momentum in the earlier than later days after movie release. We also plot the dynamics in

1

IMDb was ranked 25th, Rotten Tomatoes 322nd, and Metacritic 841st for websites in the United States on Alexa.com,
accessed July 2019.
2
Please see Figure A1 in the Appendix for a Pareto chart of the distribution of spoiler reviews across movies.
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the proportion of spoiler reviews in Figure 2(b). The average proportion of spoiler reviews across
movies is 26% on day one and gradually increases to 31% by the end of the eighth week.
Figure 1. User Review Guidelines on IMDb

Figure 2. Cumulative Volume and Proportion of Spoiler Reviews over Time
(a) Dynamics in Cumulative Volume

(b) Dynamics in Proportion of Spoiler Reviews
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Table 1. Variable Definitions
Variable Name
DAILYREV
INTENSITY
PROP
!"#$%&'()
!"#*+,
ADVERT
THEATERS
AGE (t)
HOLIDAY
DAYOFWEEK

Description
Box office revenue on day t for movie i.
Spoiler intensity of spoiler reviews within the last 10 days of day t for
movie i.
Moving average of proportion of spoiler reviews within the last 10 days
of day t for movie i.
Mean ratings of cumulative movie reviews on day t for movie i.
Number of cumulative movie reviews on day t for movie i.
Average daily advertising expenditure on day t for movie i.
Number of theaters that screen movie i on day t.
Number of days since the release of movie i in theaters.
Dummy variable for the 10 federal holidays in the United States.
Indicator variables for each day of the week.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Daily level
DAILYREV (in $)
INTENSITY
PROP
CUMRATING
CUMVOL
ADVERT (in $1,000)
THEATERS
Movie level
MPAA ratings
G & PG
PG-13
R
Unrated
Genres
Action
Adventure/Sci-Fi
Comedy
Drama
Family
Foreign
Horror
Musical
Romance
Thriller
Release type
Limited Release

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

1,039,985
2.48
.18
6.27
12.87
126.3
1,240

3,265,580
2.69
.15
1.48
247.73
621.7
1,309

5
0
0
0
0
0
1

119,119,282
45.17
1
10
4,276
6,807
4,535

.15
.40
.40
.05

.36
.49
.49
.21

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

.09
.10
.20
.32
.10
.02
.06
.02
.02
.08

.28
.30
.40
.47
.30
.14
.24
.12
.14
.27

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.40

.49

0

1
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2.6 Measuring Spoiler Intensity
Uncovering Topics from Review Text
The construction of spoiler intensity requires revealing a multitude of plot-related topics from
review texts (Property 2). We use text mining—in particular, CTM (Blei and Lafferty 2005)—to
uncover the set of topics that generate movie reviews. CTM is an extension of latent Dirichlet
allocation (LDA; Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003), which has been used in previous marketing
research to study the emerging topics in scholarly articles (Wang et al. 2015), the dimensions of
customer product reviews (Tirunillai and Tellis 2014), and the predictive power of text in peerto-peer loan applications (Netzer, Lemaire, and Herzenstein 2019). CTM replaces the Dirichlet
distribution in LDA with a multinomial distribution in its data generation process. This
modification allows flexible correlations between topics and therefore leads to an improved fit
with the data (Blei and Lafferty 2005, 2007). Indeed, we find that CTM consistently outperforms
LDA in terms of model fit in our empirical context, which provides support for the use of CTM
in this study.3 To apply the CTM, we prepare the textual data by removing stop words,
tokenizing each word using a standard stemming algorithm, and removing sparse words that
appear in less than 1% of movie reviews. This procedure yields a pre-processed document-term
matrix of 140,869 reviews (including both spoiler and non-spoiler reviews) represented by 1,624
unique words.
We refer to a movie review as a document, and the collection of movie reviews as a
corpus. The CTM of each document from the corpus can be described as follows:
1. Draw !|{$, &} ~ *($, &).

3

Please see Figure A2 in the Appendix for details regarding the model fit comparison between CTM and LDA.
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2. For each word - contained in the document:
a. Draw topic assignment variable .|! from Multinomial(/(!)),
b. Draw a word -|., 0 from Multinomial(0).
where /(!) in step 2a maps a natural parameterization of ! = (!! , … , !" ) to the vector of topic
probabilities 3 = (3! , … , 3" ) expressed below:
3# = /(!# ) =

exp (!# )
∑"
#$! exp (!# )

(2.1)

The data generation process of CTM can be interpreted as follows. When a user starts
writing a movie review, he or she first decides on the weight of each topic (3# ) that will appear
in the movie review from a fixed number of topics (K). When choosing which word to write, the
user selects a topic (.) according to its probabilistic distribution (Multinomial(3)). Conditional
on the topic (.), the user’s word choice (-) is then drawn from the associated distribution
(Multinomial(0)). The mapping of η to 3 in Equation (2.1) allows the K×1 vector of topic
probabilities for each document to carry a correlational relationship from Σ. We estimate the
posterior distribution of the latent variables using a variational Expectation-Maximization
algorithm (Roberts, Stewart, and Airoldi 2016). We refer interested readers to Blei and Lafferty
(2007) for the derivation of the posterior distribution for CTM.
The CTM assumes a fixed number of topics K, which is a hyperparameter that must be
predetermined by researchers (Chang et al. 2009). We use the algorithm proposed by Lee and
Mimno (2017), which estimates the vertices of the convex hull of word co-occurrences using a
method of t-distributed stochastic neighbor embedding. Compared to cross-validation, an
advantage of this algorithm is the computational efficiency for large data sets like the one in this
study. We find that K = 61 is the optimal number of topics for movie reviews (including spoiler

23

and non-spoiler reviews). We name each topic using its representative words and present all
topics in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Identifying Spoiling Topics
As not all topics resolve plot uncertainty, we further rely on the difference between texts in
spoiler and non-spoiler reviews to identify the set of topics deemed important in resolving plot
uncertainty. To better explain the intuition behind the identification strategy, we provide
examples of a spoiler review and a non-spoiler review in Figure 3, both of which are real reviews
for the movie About Time. Notably, the text of each review can be well summarized by its
underlying topics. For example, the non-spoiler review includes topics related to
“cinematography” and “acting performance,” and the spoiler review includes topics related to
“relationship” and “death,” as evidenced by sentences in their associated colors.
Figure 3. Examples of Spoiler and Non-Spoiler Reviews for the Movie About Time

The topics revealed in the non-spoiler review and those revealed in the spoiler review are
different in terms of the amount of plot-related information. Two plot-related topics that we
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clearly observe in the spoiler review are “death” (which occurred at the end of the movie) and
“relationship” (between the protagonist Tim and his father). Although the non-spoiler review
describes the movie as a “tear-jerker,” the plot details as to why the movie is a “tear-jerker” are
not provided. Another observation is that both reviews mentioned “time travel,” suggesting that
the topic of time travel is not regarded as spoiling for this movie. Therefore, not all topics that
appear in movie reviews are regarded spoiling; a spoiling topic is more likely to occur in spoiler
than non-spoiler reviews, whereas a non-spoiling topic has either equal or higher likelihood to
appear in non-spoiler reviews.
To identify spoiling topics, we run a logistic regression in which the outcome variable is
the review type (i.e., 1 = spoiler, 0 = non-spoiler), and predictors are the number of words in a
review associated with each topic. We operationalize the number of words from topic j in review
l as -%& = 3%& × <& , where 3%& is the weight of topic j in review l from the estimation of CTM, and
<& is the number of words in review l.4 We also include movie dummies in the regression to
account for movie heterogeneity.
We report in Table 3 the 23 topics that have significantly larger weights (p < .05) in
spoiler reviews than in non-spoiler reviews. The top three spoiler-related topics (i.e., topics that
weigh the most in spoiler reviews) are “disappointment,” “kill,” and “death.” Not surprisingly,
“kill” and “death” are often involved in critical plot points of movies (e.g., death of the main
character). The topic “disappointment” is associated with words “worst,” “ruin,” and
“disappoint.” These are common words one might use when expressing one’s unsatisfactory
movie experience followed by the reveal of plot information as a justification. Although not
presented in Table 3, the top three topics related to non-spoiler reviews (i.e., topics that weigh

4

We report in Appendix B.1 more details about the predictive power of topics from CTM.
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the most in non-spoiler reviews) are: “cinematography,” “expectation,” and “acting
performance.” The topic “cinematography” is associated with the words “beautiful,” “visual,”
and “set,” which are related to the visual appeal of the movie and therefore unrelated to movie
plot. Similarly, “expectation” (associated with the words “time,” “expect,” and “watch”) and
“acting performance” (associated with the words “actor,” “perform,” and “role”) are not directly
associated with the plot of the movie. This comparison between the top topics related to spoiler
and non-spoiler reviews provides some face validity to our identification of spoiling topics.
Table 3. Topics Associated with Spoiler Reviews
Topic Name
America
Book
Character Development
Death
Disappointment
Emotion
Fight
Ghost
Historical
Humans and Robots
Kill
Length of Movie
Lesson
Office
Overall Evaluation
Relationship
Romance
Science Fiction
Soundtrack
Space Travel
Star Wars Characters
Survival
Western

Coefficient
1.582e-02
2.796e-02
1.021e-02
5.816e-02
4.457e-01
3.205e-02
1.472e-02
9.521e-03
7.063e-03
1.657e-02
1.889e-01
1.349e-02
7.624e-03
2.797e-02
5.410e-02
3.160e-02
2.939e-02
8.301e-03
2.186e-02
2.850e-02
3.177e-02
1.425e-02
9.939e-03

Std. Error
5.973e-03
3.489e-03
2.610e-03
5.282e-03
6.030e-02
3.718e-03
2.448e-03
3.969e-03
2.646e-03
5.245e-03
4.407e-03
2.329e-03
2.867e-03
3.144e-03
2.892e-03
2.848e-03
4.327e-03
3.566e-03
3.471e-03
2.932e-03
2.074e-03
3.644e-03
4.860e-03

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Significance
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
*
**
**
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
*

Constructing the Spoiler Intensity Metric
With the uncovered set of topics that constitute spoiling information, we further construct the
spoiler intensity metric following the guidance of the remaining three properties previously
discussed (i.e., Property 1, 3, and 4). To better illustrate these properties, we provide two spoiler
reviews for the movie About Time (one of which is the same review as in Figure 3), and one
spoiler review for The Lego Batman Movie in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Example of Topic Distributed in Spoiler Reviews Across Movies

Comparing the two spoiler reviews for About Time, we notice that spoiling topics may
receive different degrees of elaboration. Spoiler review A provides more details for the topic of
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“relationship” than spoiler review B. In particular, spoiler review A reveals that the protagonist’s
father can time travel as the ability is heritable, and that the father is involved in the movie’s
emotional ending. Spoiler review B provides a relatively limited description that the topic of
relationship is not saccharine, and that it is taken seriously by the movie. As the degree of
elaboration is often associated with the length of description, we use the number of words related
to each topic (-%& ) as a proxy for the amount of plot-related information revealed in a spoiler
review. This specification renders the spoiler intensity variable continuous and therefore satisfies
Property 1.
Property 3 suggests that the degree of spoiling per topic might vary across movies. For
example, in addition to spoiler reviews A and B, spoiler review C for The Lego Batman Movie in
Figure 4 also discusses the topic of relationship (between Batman and the Joker). However, since
The Lego Batman Movie is a comedy, the degree of spoiling from reading the topic of
relationship is potentially less than that for a romantic movie like About Time. As such, for each
J = 23 plot-related topic, we quantify the degree of spoiling of topic j for movie i. Recall that the
probability of review l associated with movie i being a spoiler review is predicted by the logistic
model as follows:
='& =

exp(>-& + @' )
1 + exp(>-& + @' )

(2.2)

where -& = (-!& , … , -"& ), and @' is the fixed effect of movie i.
We calculate the contribution of spoiling information from topic j in review l as follows:
A'%& =

expB>(-%& + 1) + C-(%& + @' D
1 + expB>(-%& + 1) + C-(%& + @' D

−

expB>-%& + C-(%& + @' D
1 + expB>-%& + C-(%& + @' D

(2.3)

where -(%& is a vector of the number of words from other topics. The difference of the two terms
on the right-hand side of Equation (2.3) measures the change in the likelihood (='& ) in response to
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!

a topic share increase in 3%& (i.e., B3%& + Δ3D × <& = -%& + 1, where Δ3 = ) ). A greater A'%&
!

suggests a higher degree of spoiling from topic j in review l for movie i.
We aggregate the degree of spoiling of topic j for movie i, denoted by H'% , using the
normalized sum of A'%& across all reviews of movie i as follows:
H'% =

"
∑*&$!
A'%&

(2.4)

"
∑+%$!B∑*&$!
A'%& D

where J' represents the set of all reviews associated with movie i, and ∑+%$! H'% = 1. The
parameter H'% in Equation (2.4) measures the spoiling effect of topic j for movie i, suggesting
that the inclusion of H'% in spoiler intensity metric will satisfy Property 3.
Let K', denote the set of spoiler reviews for movie i generated within a lagged timewindow of day t. We operationalize spoiler intensity of movie i on day t using all spoiler reviews
from K', as follows:
+

LMNOMKLNP', = Q

%$!

H'% × Max -%&
&∈."#

(2.5)

Property 4 suggests that once the spoiling information related to a certain topic has been
revealed, information from the same topic does not further reduce plot uncertainty when it
reappears in subsequent reviews, unless additional information is provided. Consider again the
two spoiler reviews for About Time in Figure 4. If an individual reads spoiler review A after
spoiler review B, this individual can further reduce plot uncertainty because spoiler review A
contains more specific plot details regarding the topic of relationship (e.g., with the protagonist’s
father, his involvement in the emotional ending) than spoiler review B, which only indicates that
the movie treats relationships between characters seriously. However, if the order is reversed
(i.e., reading spoiler review B after spoiler review A), it is unlikely for the individual to reduce
plot uncertainty by spoiler review B because much of the plot-related information has been
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covered by spoiler review A. As such, we use the maximum function in Equation (2.5) to capture
Property 4 of the spoiler intensity metric. The maximum function ensures that once a piece of
information has been spoiled, it cannot spoil again. We provide evidence for the validity of the
proposed spoiler intensity metric in capturing the level of spoiling information perceived by real
people in Appendix B.2.
We choose the lag window that we use to construct spoiler-related variables (i.e., spoiler
intensity and spoiler volume) to be 10 days based on a separate panel data set of movie reviews
that we collected for 45 movies released in the United States in April 2019. For each movie, we
tracked first-page spoiler reviews on IMDb daily in April 2019. The recency of spoiler reviews
on the first page has a mean of 9.53 days, where we calculate the recency of each spoiler review
by the difference between the date of observation and the date of creation. Therefore, we assume
that consumers typically read spoiler reviews generated within the last 10 days.

2.7 Empirical Analysis
Model of Box Office Revenue
Let i denote movies and t the days after release. The dependent variable is ln(WXLJPYOZ)', ,
which represents the log-transformed daily box office revenue for movie i on day t. To examine
the relationship between spoiler reviews and box office revenue, we consider the following
model specification:
ln(WXLJPYOZ)',
= 0! ln(WXLJPYOZ)',,(! + 00 ln(LMNOMKLNP)',,(! + 01 [Y\[',,(!
+ 02 ln(]^_YXNLM`)',,(! + 03 ln(]^_Z\J)',,(! + 04 ln(XWZOYN)',,(!
4

+ 05 ln(NaOXNOYK)', +06 b + 07 a\JLWXP', + Q >% L{WXP\cdOOe', = f }
8$!

+ @' + g',
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(2.6)

We include the lagged dependent variable, ln(WXLJPYOZ)',,(! , on the right-hand side of
Equation (2.6) to better capture the dynamics and indirectly control for past realizations of
independent variables (e.g., WOM-related variables), which can persist to influence
contemporaneous box office revenue (Keele and Kelly 2006). INTENSITY denotes the spoiler
intensity described in Equation (2.5), and PROP measures the proportion of spoiler volume,
defined as the moving average of the proportion of spoiler reviews to total movie reviews within
the last 10 days (i.e., from t-10 to t-1).5
For controls, we include the mean rating (CUMRATING) and volume (CUMVOL) of
cumulative movie reviews because IMDb presents these summary statistics on the main page of
each movie. We also include marketing mix variables, which comprise log-transformed
advertising expenditure (ADVERT) and theater release count (THEATERS); and time-related
variables, which comprise days after movie release (t), a dummy variable for federal holidays in
the United States (HOLIDAY), and indicator variables (L {∙}) for each day of the week
(DAYOFWEEK).
In line with previous research (e.g., Duan, Gu, and Whinston 2008; Liu 2006), we lag
WOM-related and marketing mix variables except for the number of theaters to alleviate
simultaneity concerns. We include @, the movie fixed effect, to control for time-invariant
heterogeneity of movies that include observable factors (e.g., budget, genre, star power) and
unobservable factors (e.g., quality of the script, plot). Finally, g is the idiosyncratic error term
with a mean of zero.
Endogeneity Issues

5

We log-transform INTENSITY using ln($ + 1). PROP is not in log because it is bounded between 0 and 1.
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It is well known that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a predictor leads to a
specific endogeneity issue known as the dynamic panel bias (Nickell 1981). As such, we
estimate Equation (2.6) using the generalized method of moments (GMM) proposed by Blundell
and Bond (1998). This estimation approach involves instrumenting the lagged dependent
variable using both of its lagged levels and lagged differences. Our panel data allows the use of
multiple lags (i.e., lags 2 and up) as GMM-type instruments to increase the efficiency of our
estimation (Blundell and Bond 1998).
Unobserved time-variant characteristics of movies can induce a correlation between the
regressors and the error term. The first potential source of endogeneity stems from the WOMrelated variables. For example, unobserved offline WOM may increase both the demand for
movies and the number of movie reviews. In addition, a user’s interest in writing a spoiler review
may also be associated with unobserved demand factors. Our solution follows Anderson and
Hsiao (1981, 1982) to instrument the endogenous variable (CUMVOL, PROP, and INTENSITY)
using its lagged level. The lagged levels of the endogenous variables are valid instruments under
zero second-order autocorrelation (Anderson and Hsiao 1981, 1982), an assumption we
empirically checked and confirmed.
Moreover, strategic information held by movie studios may also be a potential source of
endogeneity. After a movie’s release, private market information may be obtained by studio
managers, allowing for adjustments of THEATERS and ADVERT. We follow previous research
(e.g., Chintagunta, Gopinath, and Venkataraman 2010; Lu, Wang, and Bendle 2020) to use the
means of THEATERS and ADVERT of other movies from the same genre as movie i and the
same number of days t from the release as instruments for NaOXNOYK', and XWZOYN', . The
rationale for the relevance of these instruments is similar to that provided by Chintagunta,

32

Gopinath, and Venkataraman (2010): movies of the same genre are likely to share similar release
patterns and promotional strategies. The exclusion restrictions of these instruments stem from the
fact that the means of marketing mixes set by other movies at different times are unlikely to be
correlated with the current demand shock of the focal movie.
Empirical Findings
We begin with standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the model of box office
revenue without the lagged dependent variable.6 We report the results in column 1 of Table 4,
which provides preliminary evidence that the association between spoiler intensity and box
office revenue is positive and significant (.180, p < .001). We find that the association between
spoiler volume and box office revenue is also positive and significant (.564, p < .001). Estimates
for the control variables are of expected signs. For example, both CUMRATING and CUMVOL
have positive associations with box office revenue. In addition, box office revenue is greater for
movies that played in a larger number of theaters and spent more on advertising.
In column 2 of Table 4, we present model estimates using standard fixed effects
regression and report robust standard errors clustered at the movie level. After controlling for
time-invariant heterogeneity of movies, the association between spoiler intensity and box office
revenue remains positive and significant (.045, p < .001), whereas the association between
spoiler volume and box office revenue becomes nonsignificant (-.016, p > .05).
We report estimates using the GMM method (Blundell and Bond 1998) in column 3 and
column 4 of Table 4, where robust standard errors clustered at the movie level are reported. We
show the results with endogeneity correction for only the lagged dependent variable in column 3,
and endogeneity corrections for the lagged dependent variable, WOM-related variables, and

6

Including the lagged dependent variable in OLS leads to an almost perfect linear relationship (adjusted R-square of
1); therefore, the results are uninformative.
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marketing mix variables in column 4. We conduct Hansen’s J-test and the Arellano-Bond test for
AR(2) to check the validity of over-identifying restrictions and second-order autocorrelation,
respectively. The p-values of the J-test and the test for AR(2) are .362 and .147 for column 3,
and .488 and .134 for column 4, supporting the validity of proposed instruments and providing
no evidence of second-order autocorrelation. Results from both GMM specifications show that
the coefficient of INTENSITY is positive and significant. Although the estimate of PROP is
positive and significant in column 3, it becomes nonsignificant in column 4 after the endogeneity
corrections for WOM-related and marketing mix variables. We focus on the results in column 4
in the rest of the article because of the more careful endogeneity corrections. The log-log model
indicates that one percentage increase in spoiler intensity for movie i on day t is associated with
a .06 percentage increase in box office revenue on the following day.
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Table 4. Estimation Results of the Model of Box Office Revenue

'-./01/2.
ln(6%',7$8*)!,#$%
ln('(&8(:'&7)!,#$%
;$+;!,#$%
ln(!"#$%&'())!,#$%
ln(!"#*+,)!,#$%
ln(%6*8$&)!,#$%
ln(&<8%&8$:)!#
%)8 (.)
<+,'6%7!#
DAYOFWEEK Dummies
Movie Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-Squared
Cluster-Robust Standard Error
Number of Observations

OLS

FE

GMM with
IVs for Lagged
DV

GMM with IVs
for Lagged DV,
WOM, &
Marketing Mix

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

5.958***
(.025)
-

-

-

-

.474***
(.011)
.045***
(.008)
-.016
(.031)
-.004
(.020)
-.192***
(.014)
.018***
(.002)
.431***
(.010)
-.019***
(.001)
.572***
(.016)
Yes
Yes
.952
Yes

.606***
(.013)
.077***
(.014)
.170**
(.055)
.202***
(.029)
.048***
(.008)
.051***
(.003)
.356***
(.012)
-.012***
(.001)
.558***
(.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes

.638***
(.017)
.060***
(.014)
.075
(.062)
.171***
(.027)
.037***
(.010)
.097***
(.007)
.337***
(.020)
-.008***
(.001)
.533***
(.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes

.180***
(.010)
.564***
(.041)
.457***
(.012)
.140***
(.004)
.123***
(.002)
.894***
(.002)
-.033***
(3.33e-4)
.759***
(.023)
Yes
No
.899
No

49,057
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Robustness Checks
We check the robustness of our findings against alternative measures of spoiler reviews and
report estimation results from GMM with IV corrections in Table 5.7 We first re-estimate the
model in Equation (2.6) using simpler measures of spoiler reviews. In column 1, we consider a
benchmark model to include K[\LJOY, a dummy variable that equals one if there is at least one
spoiler review within the last 10 days, to capture the relationship between the availability of
spoiler reviews and box office revenues. In column 2, we replace INTENSITY in Equation (2.6)
with Md\YWK, the total count of words associated with spoiling topics in spoiler reviews within
the last 10 days. Consistent with the main findings, both K[\LJOY and ln(Md\YWK) have
positive and significant associations with box office revenue.
We further check the sensitivity of our results against various aspects in the spoiler
intensity specification. In particular, we consider an alternative spoiler intensity metric denoted
!

by LMNOMKLNP 9 , which assumes equal weight (i.e., H'% = + in Equation 2.5) among spoiling
topics (column 3), or uses average function for aggregation (column 4), or uses sum function for
aggregation (column 5), or uses a longer lag window of three weeks (column 6)8, which covers
92.1% of first-page spoiler reviews according to the data collected in April 2019. Across column
3 to column 6, the coefficient of ln(LMNOMKLNP 9 ) is positive and significant, whereas the
coefficient of [Y\[ is nonsignificant, supporting the robustness of our findings.
Lastly, we consider the possibility that high-quality movies can attract more intense
spoiler reviews over time, creating the risk that the cross-sectional differences in box office
dynamics can load onto the spoiler intensity variable. To test this possibility, we allow for

7
8

We conduct additional robustness checks to spoiler intensity from non-spoiler reviews in Appendix B.3.
We update the variable PROP using the three-week window accordingly.
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heterogeneous time trend across movies by including an interaction term between CUMRATING
and AGE, in which CUMRATING serves as a proxy for movie quality. Results in column 7
confirm that the positive effect of spoiler intensity still holds.
Table 5. Estimation Results from Robustness Checks
Simpler Measures of
Spoiler Reviews

Alternative Specifications of Spoiler
Intensity

ln(*01.02*1,)$,&'(

(1)
.637***
(.017)
-

(2)
.625***
(.018)
-

(3)
.647***
(.017)
-

(4)
.649***
(.017)
-

(5)
.661***
(.016)
-

(6)
.652***
(.017)
-

ln(*01.02*1, ) )$,&'(

-

-

234*+.-$,&'(

-

.102**
(.038)
-

.064***
(.009)
-

.060*
(.026)
-

ln(054-(2)$,&'(

.082***
(.017)
-

.072***
(.012)
-

3-43$,&'(

-

ln(678-)1*09)$,&'(

ln(()*+,-./)$,&'(

Heterogeneous
Trend
(7)
.622***
(.018)
.067***
(.015)
-

.036***
(.005)
-.072
(.066)

-

-

-

-

-

4.68e-4
(.056)

.100
(.061)

-.021
(.055)

.052
(.087)

.097
(.069)

.161***
(.028)
.050***
(.010)
.101***
(.007)
.338***
(.020)
-.008***
(.001)
.534***
(.018)

.168***
(.027)
.033***
(.010)
.101***
(.007)
.340***
(.020)
-.007***
(.001)
.535***
(.018)

.166***
(.027)
.028**
(.009)
.089***
(.006)
.335***
(.019)
-.007***
(.001)
.531***
(.018)

.171***
(.027)
.037***
(.010)
.085***
(.006)
.332***
(.019)
-.008***
(.001)
.532***
(.018)

.171***
(.025)
.023*
(.010)
.080***
(.006)
.309***
(.017)
-.007***
(.001)
.528***
(.018)

.164***
(.027)
.040***
(.011)
.094***
(.006)
.317***
(.018)
-.008***
(.001)
.528***
(.018)

.115**
(.037)
.043***
(.011)
.103***
(.007)
.344***
(.020)
-.013***
(.003)
.536***
(.018)

ln($%&'()*+,)!,#$% × /

-

-

-

-

-

-

.003*
(.001)

DAYOFWEEK Dummies
Movie Fixed Effects
Endogeneity Corrections

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

ln(678/4+)$,&'(
ln()(/.-1)$,&'(
ln(1:.)1.-2)$&
)9. (<)
:4+*(),$&

Cluster-Robust Standard Error

Number of Observations

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
49,057

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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2.8 Underlying Mechanism
We further investigate the behavioral mechanism that may drive the positive effect of spoiler
reviews on demand. For experiential products like movies, potential consumers often visit online
review platforms to seek diagnostic information to resolve uncertainty (Dellarocas 2003; Goh,
Heng, and Lin 2013). Compared to non-spoiler reviews, spoiler reviews are more diagnostic in
reducing uncertainty because spoiler reviews can reveal important plot-related information as
justification when critiquing a movie, while non-spoiler reviews cannot. The reduction in
potential moviegoers’ uncertainty about movie quality due to spoiler reviews might lead to
higher demand.
Moderator Analysis
To indirectly test the uncertainty-reduction mechanism of spoiler reviews, we consider four
potential moderators of the effect of spoiler intensity: (i) release type (limited release vs. wide
release), (ii) movie age, (iii) advertising, and (iv) average user rating. If uncertainty reduction is
important, we expect the positive effect of spoiler intensity to be stronger under greater movie
uncertainty.
We first consider whether the positive effect of spoiler intensity varies by the release type
of a movie. Intuitively, it is in the movie studio’s financial interest to play the movie in as many
theaters as possible. However, a wide release strategy typically requires significant marketing
investment and substantial negotiating power on behalf of the distributor (Kerrigan 2017). As a
result, this strategy is often reserved for mainstream and potential blockbuster movies, whereas
independent movies often employ a limited release strategy. Compared to mainstream movies
(typically developed to appeal to the masses and thus more predictable or formulaic),
independent movies are generally avant-garde and associated with higher uncertainty in terms of
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artistic quality (Holbrook 1999). As such, we anticipate the positive effect of spoiler intensity to
be stronger for independent movies — which, as noted, often use limited release.9 We follow the
literature to define a limited release movie, denoted by a dummy variable LIMITED, as a movie
that plays in less than 700 theaters on its opening day, and a wide release movie (i.e., LIMITED =
0) as a movie that plays in more than 700 theaters (Fellman 2006; Kerrigan 2017).
We also examine the moderating role of movie age. We expect that consumers have
higher movie uncertainty in the earlier (vs. later) period of a movie’s life cycle since more
quality signals (e.g., online WOM) become available as time goes by. For instance, past box
office revenue can serve as a quality signal for potential moviegoers because high-quality movies
tend to accrue greater ticket sales over time than low-quality movies (Moon, Bergey, and
Iacobucci 2010). Following this rationale, we anticipate the positive effect of spoiler intensity to
be greater in the earlier period after the movie release due to the higher movie uncertainty.
It is well known that the informative function of advertising can reduce product
uncertainty for potential buyers (Bagwell 2007; Hoch and Ha 1986). For example, Kim and
Krishnan (2015) find that product descriptions and video commercials provided by online market
platforms have a significant effect in reducing product uncertainty for intangible products.
Moreover, Basuroy, Desai, and Talukdar (2006) suggest that advertising can serve as a credible
signal of quality in the movie industry because any upward deviation of true quality in
advertising content (i.e., overselling) can result in negative WOM and long-term harms, and
therefore will not be adopted by movie studios. Based on these findings, we expect that the
positive effect of spoiler intensity is more salient for movies that spend less on advertising.

9

Release type is more objective and well-defined in the industry than movie type, which is subjective in nature.
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The last moderator we consider is average user rating. Compared to extreme ratings
(either very high or low), ratings in the middle range tend to convey more ambiguous signals
about movie quality (Tang, Fang, and Wang 2014). Thus, we expect that for movies with
moderate or mixed ratings, consumers are more likely to seek additional information to reduce
movie uncertainty. Following this line of thought, we hypothesize an inverted-U relationship
between the effect of spoiler intensity and average user ratings. To test this relationship, we
classify our movie sample into quartiles based on the average user ratings, and then include the
first and fourth quartile dummies—denoted as QUART1 and QUART4, respectively—as
moderators for spoiler intensity.10
We examine the moderators by re-estimating Equation (2.6) with additional interaction
terms with spoiler intensity using GMM. We report estimation results in Table 6, where column
1 presents the results without the interactions between spoiler intensity and quartile dummies of
average user ratings, and column 2 presents results using the complete set of moderators.11 Given
the consistency of estimates, we summarize findings by focusing on the results in column 2. In
line with our hypotheses, the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction between
INTENSITY and LIMITED suggests that the positive effect of spoiler intensity is greater for
limited release movies than for wide release movies. The negative and significant coefficient of
the interaction between INTENSITY and t indicates a decay in the effect of spoiler reviews over
time. Furthermore, the positive effect of spoiler intensity is negatively associated with
advertising spending and is stronger for movies with moderate user ratings. The negative and
significant coefficients of the interaction terms between INTENSITY and the two quartile

10

We do not include the interaction terms between spoiler intensity and average user rating and its squared term
directly because of multicollinearity: the variance inflation factor has a mean of 13.44 and a maximum of 69.10.
11
P-values of Hansen’s J-test and the test for AR(2) are .713 and .306 for column 1, and .645 and .498 for column 2.
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dummies (i.e., QUART1 and QUART4) reveal an inverted-U relationship between average user
rating and the effect of spoiler intensity on box office revenue. In sum, the results from the
moderator analysis are consistent with the uncertainty-reduction mechanism of spoiler reviews.
Table 6. Estimation Results of the Model with Interaction Terms with Spoiler Intensity
Excluding Interaction
with Quartile
Dummies of Average
User Ratings

Including Interaction
with Quartile
Dummies of Average
User Ratings

(1)
.351***
(.067)
-.005***
(.001)
-.186***
(.026)

(2)
.439***
(.071)
-.002**
(.001)
-.163***
(.022)

ln('(&8(:'&7)&' !,#$% × ?"%$&1!

-

ln('(&8(:'&7)&' !,#$% × ?"%$&4!

-

ln(6%',7$8*)!,#$%

.529***
(.019)
.085*
(.041)
-.119
(.101)
.214***
(.052)
.058***
(.016)
.193***
(.018)
.430***
(.021)
-.012***
(.001)
.552***
(.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-.409***
(.079)
-.250***
(.052)
.499***
(.018)
.154**
(.050)
-.136
(.109)
.194***
(.054)
.036*
(.017)
.215***
(.018)
.484***
(.020)
-.010***
(.001)
.560***
(.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

ln('(&8(:'&7)&' !,#$% × ,'#'&86!
ln('(&8(:'&7)&' !,#$% × .
ln('(&8(:'&7)&' !,#$% × ln(%6*8$&)&'
!,#$%

ln('(&8(:'&7)&' !,#$%
;$+;!,#$%
ln(!"#$%&'())!,#$%
ln(!"#*+,)!,#$%
ln(%6*8$&)&' !,#$%
ln(&<8%&8$:)!#
%)8 (.)
<+,'6%7!#
DAYOFWEEK Dummies
Movie Fixed Effects
Endogeneity Corrections
Cluster-Robust Standard Error
Number of Observations

49,057

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. “MC” denotes mean-centered.
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Event Study
We provide additional support for the uncertainty-reduction mechanism using an event study,
which focuses on an exogenous IMDb website update on December 11, 2017 (IMDb 2017). This
update made two major changes to the way movie reviews are displayed on IMDb: (i) reviews
are displayed only in the order of “helpfulness” (from most helpful to least helpful), while
reviews could be sorted in a variety of ways (e.g., by date, most positive/negative, etc.) prior to
the update; and (ii) the content of spoiler reviews is hidden by default and IMDb requires users to
manually click on the spoiler review to see the content. The ability to sort reviews by methods
other than helpfulness was restored after a subsequent update on February 10, 2018.
Theoretically, displaying all reviews according to their helpfulness should increase the
diagnostic value of non-spoiler reviews and therefore decrease the relative usefulness of spoiler
reviews in reducing movie uncertainty. In addition, hiding spoiler reviews by default increases
the consumers’ cost of reading spoiler reviews. Because of the decrease in relative benefit and
the increase in cost of reading, we expect the positive effect of spoiler reviews on demand to be
smaller after the IMDb update.
To compare the effect of spoiler reviews before and after the IMDb update (see Figure 5
for an example), we collected the daily box office revenue data for all 47 movies that were
screened in the United States both before and after December 11, 2017. For these 47 movies, we
further collected a total of 16,742 movie reviews, 4,309 of which are spoiler reviews. We report
the descriptive statistics in Table 7.
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Figure 5. Screenshot of Spoiler Reviews Before and After the Update
a. Before December 11, 2017

b. After December 11, 2017

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Data in the Event Study
Variable
DAILYREV (in $1,000)
THEATERS
CUMRATING
CUMVOL
PROP
INTENSITY

Mean
664
839
6.46
347.4
.11
3.66

Standard Deviation
2,536
1,162
1.65
438.3
.14
4.00

Minimum
.005
1
0
1
0
0

Maximum
50,426
4,535
10
2,506
1
23.08

We apply the same method to measure spoiler intensity, and estimate the following model:
ln(WXLJPYOZ)',
= C! ln(WXLJPYOZ)',,(! + C0 ln(LMNOMKLNP)',,(! + C1 [Y\[',,(!
+ C2 ln(]^_YXNLM`)',,(! + C3 ln(]^_Z\J)',,(!
+ C4 ln(XWZOYN)',,(! +C5 ln(NaOXNOYK)', + C6 b + C7 a\JLWXP',
+ C!: OZOMN', + C!! ln(LMNOMKLNP)',,(! × OZOMN',
4

+ C!0 [Y\[',,(! × OZOMN', + Q >% L{WXP\cdOOe', = f } + @'
8$!

+ g',

(2.7)
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where OZOMN', is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation was after December 11,
2017. We allow the effects of spoiler-related variables to be different before and after the update.
In particular, C0 (C1 ) and C!! (C!0 ) measure the effect of spoiler intensity (spoiler volume) on
box office revenue before and after the update, respectively.
We use the GMM approach with panel instruments to estimate Equation (2.7). We do not
use instruments for the marketing mix variables, mainly because of the relatively small sample
associated with the event (i.e., 47 movies), which prevents us from creating IVs based on other
movies from the same genre. We report the estimation results of Equation (2.7) in Table 8, where
only the event dummy is added to the model in column 1, and additional interactions between the
event dummy and spoiler-related variables are added to the model in column 2.
We see results consistent with our main findings: INTENSITY is a significant and positive
predictor of box office revenue, while the effect of spoiler volume captured by PROP is
nonsignificant. The coefficient of EVENT is also nonsignificant, suggesting that the IMDb
update is not directly associated with the box office revenues of movies that were screened
around this time. This result is not surprising, as the update only affected the display—not the
availability—of movie reviews on the platform. Our main parameter of interest is the coefficient
of the interaction between EVENT and INTENSITY. If the uncertainty-reduction mechanism is
the key driver of the positive effect of spoiler reviews, the positive effect of INTENSITY should
be attenuated after the update. We indeed see that the coefficient of the interaction between
EVENT and INTENSITY is significant and negative.
Is it possible that the decrease in the effect of spoiler intensity is driven by behavioral
changes after the update? Specifically, might users be less willing to write detailed spoiler
reviews after the update because of the unappealing changes regarding the display of spoiler
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reviews? To investigate this possibility, we regress INTENSITY on AGE, HOLIDAY,
DAYOFWEEK, EVENT, and movie fixed effects, and find that EVENT is negative but
statistically nonsignificant. Thus, we failed to find evidence that the IMDb update affected the
intensity of new spoiler reviews posted on the platform.
Table 8. Impacts of Spoiler Reviews Before and After the IMDb Website Update
Excluding Interactions
with Event Dummy

Including Interactions
with Event Dummy

ln('(&8(:'&7)!,#$% × 8*8(&!#

(1)
.720***
(.027)
.195***
(.043)
-.133
(.310)
.042
(.067)
.027
(.028)
.043***
(.010)
.232***
(.026)
-.004**
(.001)
.628***
(.048)
-.034
(.066)
-

;$+;!,#$% × 8*8(&!#

-

DAYOFWEEK Dummies
Movie Fixed Effects
Cluster-Robust Standard Error
Number of Observations

Yes
Yes
Yes

(2)
.717***
(.029)
.293***
(.085)
-.604
(.434)
.050
(.064)
.025
(.027)
.040***
(.011)
.240***
(.029)
-.004**
(.001)
.622***
(.047)
.108
(.082)
-.155*
(.072)
.564
(.490)
Yes
Yes
Yes

ln(6%',7$8*)!,#$%
ln('(&8(:'&7)!,#$%
;$+;!,#$%
ln(!"#$%&'())!,#$%
ln(!"#*+,)!,#$%
ln(%6*8$&)!,#$%
ln(&<8%&8$:)!#
%)8 (.)
<+,'6%7!#
8*8(&!#

4,290

* < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001.
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2.9 Discussion
Although the relationship between spoilers and media enjoyment has received some academic
attention, the relationship between spoilers and demand remains a knowledge gap in the
literature. In this research, we show that the degree of plot uncertainty resolved by movie
reviews (i.e., spoiler intensity) has a positive and significant association with box office revenue
with an elasticity of .06. In addition, we provide evidence that uncertainty reduction is the
behavioral mechanism that drives the positive effect of spoiler intensity using moderator analysis
and an event study. Our finding of the positive association is novel in the movie industry, where
the conventional knowledge is that spoilers hurt box office revenues. Moreover, our conceptual
framework of spoilers can be generalized to other product categories (e.g., television shows,
role-playing games, novels, etc.). Although we find a positive net effect of spoiler reviews in the
movie context, the relative importance of the positive uncertainty-reduction effect and the
negative surprise-burst effect of spoilers may vary across product categories, and therefore
warrants further investigation.
Managerial Implications
Our findings provide important managerial implications for movie studios, theaters, and review
platforms. Foremost, our results suggest that online review platforms can potentially increase
consumer welfare in the entertainment industry. The uncertainty-reduction mechanism that we
have uncovered suggests a spoiler-friendly review platform can provide diagnostic plot-related
information through spoiler reviews to help consumers make purchase decisions. Accordingly,
we recommend online review platforms to maintain the availability of spoiler reviews, especially
plot-intense spoiler reviews for potential consumers. We also recommend review platforms to
keep the warning labels of spoiler reviews because of the benefit of allowing consumers to self-
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select into the exposure to spoilers. These spoiler-alert warnings reduce the search cost for
consumers who seek to reduce movie uncertainty, while shield consumers who care about movie
enjoyment from the unfavorable effects of spoiler reviews. Furthermore, with advances in
information technology, online review platforms can even go one step further to customize the
number of displayed spoiler reviews and adjust the prominence of warning labels catering to an
individual consumer’s preference revealed by his or her historical spoiler reading behavior.
Second, movie studios and theaters should actively monitor the content of spoiler reviews
to better forecast future box office revenue. To demonstrate the predictive power of spoiler
intensity, we randomly split the data into quarters, and then used three-quarters of the data as a
training sample and the remaining quarter as a hold-out sample. By adding WOM-related
variables individually to the benchmark model without any WOM-related variables, we
calculated the predictive power of each WOM-related variable using the lift in the model’s Rsquared on the hold-out sample. We find that the lift in R-squared is .010 for spoiler
intensity, .007 for spoiler volume, .011 for WOM volume, and .004 for WOM valence,
suggesting that spoiler intensity explains 1% of data variation. More importantly, the predictive
power of spoiler intensity is slightly below that of WOM volume and more than twice that of
WOM valence. Given the industrial routine of monitoring WOM volume and valence in
forecasting, we recommend that movie studios and theaters also actively monitor the content of
spoiler reviews to improve forecasting performance.
Third, the benefit of monitoring the spoiler intensity of movie reviews, a particular act of
social listening, is greater for movies with less advertising spending. To support this claim, we
conducted a spotlight analysis to examine the elasticity of spoiler intensity at different levels of
advertising. Specifically, we calculated the elasticity of spoiler intensity for advertising at the
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25th ($1,243 per day) and 75th percentiles ($3,452 per day), respectively. We find that for movies
with low levels of advertising (25th percentile), the elasticity of spoiler intensity is significant and
large (.234, p < .001)—almost four times the magnitude of the elasticity for an average movie
(.060, p < .001). However, the elasticity for movies with high levels of advertising is statistically
nonsignificant (.067, p > .05). These findings suggest that movies with relatively small
advertising budgets (e.g., most movies released by independent and arthouse studios) benefit the
most from monitoring the content of spoiler reviews.
Fourth, the decay of the positive effect of spoiler intensity over time suggests that
managers should make greater monitoring efforts in the earlier, rather than later, period of a
movie’s life cycle. To identify the specific window in which it is most beneficial to monitor
spoiler reviews, we conducted a spotlight analysis for the elasticity of spoiler intensity at
different days after the movie release. We find that the elasticity is the greatest on the opening
day (.149, p < .01), and then steadily declines (i.e., week 1: .129, week 2: .110, week 3: .093, all
with p < .05) until it becomes statistically nonsignificant at the end of the fourth week (.077, p
> .05).
Finally, we highlight the boundary conditions under which movie studios might benefit
from encouraging more intense spoiler reviews that can help reduce the uncertainty of movie
quality. In particular, our findings suggest that for movies with small advertising budget and
mixed user ratings, the marketing managers should place great emphasis on stimulating online
WOM, including those that might spoil the movie plot. However, for movies with large
advertising budget and extreme user ratings, we do not recommend movie managers to
encourage consumers to generate spoiler reviews because of the lack of a significant effect on
sales. In addition, the creation of spoiler reviews after three weeks of movie release does not
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seem to generate an economically meaningful impact on sales either. Although a no-spoiler
policy is not recommended, we also caution movie studios that the dissemination of spoilers is
sometimes uncontrollable. For example, spoiler reviews on IMDb can spread via social media
where warning labels do not exist, which makes consumers more subject to the unfavorable
effect of spoilers.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
We note several limitations of this study, all of which provide promising directions for future
research. Although we focus on online movie review platforms as the main source of online
WOM, these platforms represent only one source of online WOM—one that consumers must
actively seek out. Future research could explore whether our findings can be generalized to
spoilers on social media platforms, where users are more likely to read spoilers by chance.
Furthermore, we focus on the net effect of spoilers in this research. Future research could test for
a parallel mediation of spoilers on movie demand, with a positive path via uncertainty reduction
and a negative path via the burst of surprise.
We also note that this research focuses on spoilers that are generated by consumers.
While we find a positive net effect of spoiler reviews, our results may not generalize to “leaks.”
Leaks, unlike spoilers, refer to information that is typically released from the supply side (e.g.,
movie producers, staff), either accidentally or maliciously prior to a movie’s release. Leaks can
take many forms but are often disseminated via images (e.g., camera shots on set, posters, etc.)
and videos (e.g., production footage, unedited clips, etc.). Although the effects from leaks would
be controlled by movie fixed effects in our model, conceptual questions remain as to how
spoilers and leaks differ in affecting ticket sales and whether they operate by the same behavioral
mechanism. We leave these questions to future researchers.
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Spoilers may also appear in other media, such as images on Pinterest and videos on
YouTube. A notable feature of IMDb is that it offers expressive freedom to consumers at a
relatively low cost of content generation (i.e., it is free to create an account and write reviews). In
contrast, the creation of images and videos often requires skills of artistic design, content editing,
and so on, suggesting a high cost of content generation. Consequently, we suspect that the
generation of spoilers on platforms that focus on images and videos is centralized to professional
content creators. With the advances in machine learning and unstructured data analysis, future
research could examine how user-generated spoilers delivered via media other than text affect
consumer demand.
Finally, we use the max function in the specification of spoiler intensity to capture the
discount of spoiling information that has appeared in previous spoiler reviews without the
knowledge of individual review-viewing behavior. Because detailed review-viewing data are
typically unavailable to movie studios, the proposed spoiler intensity metric should be useful to
managers in the movie industry and therefore serves as a first step. Should individual-level data
become available, future studies could relax the assumptions we made and extend the spoiler
intensity metrics for both academics and practitioners.
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3. Data Security and Firm Signaling: The Direct and Indirect
Consequences of Data Breach
3.1 Abstract
This research investigates the direct and indirect consequences of data breaches that moderate
the financial returns of subsequent firm signals. Drawing from signaling theory, I hypothesize
that data breaches serve as information to investors that leads to signal calibration. I examine 135
data breach disclosures from 72 firms in the financial and insurance services industry between
January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2018. I find that the direct financial harm from data breaches
is moderated by the firm’s reputation, and whether the perpetrator of the data breach is internal
to the firm. To study how firm signals subsequent to data breaches are affected, I examine 6,541
patent announcements and 228 executive hiring decisions made after data breaches. I find
evidence that recency and attribution of data breaches, and reputation of firms partake in the
signal calibration, subsequently moderating the signals’ financial returns. This research
contributes to a more holistic understanding of the financial consequences of data breaches.
Additionally, this research highlights the importance of firms’ internal data security, as well as
the planning involved in the delivery of firm announcements to investors following data
breaches.
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3.2 Introduction
In 2017, Equifax experienced a data breach perpetrated by a hacker that stole personal data,
including the names, addresses, and Social Security numbers, of more than 147 million
Americans. Despite the company’s chief executive officer issuing a video apology after the
official disclosure, consumers and lawmakers across the country were nonetheless appalled by
the sheer scale of the data breach (Ng 2018). Experiencing such a detrimental event can have
wide-reaching consequences, both direct and indirect to the firm.
I define a data breach as disclosure of private and confidential information to an
unauthorized party. Although a subset of instances, such as that experienced by Equifax, can
garner disproportionately large amounts of media attention, data breaches are not rare events that
affect a minority of firms. An international survey of IT professionals reveals that more than 90
percent of firms have experienced some form of threat to their data security (Kaspersky Lab
2015). Further, it is estimated that the average cost of a data breach in the United States is $8.64
million, which is increasing annually (Ponemon Institute 2020; Berinato and Perry 2018). This
highlights the importance for firms to not only prevent potential data breaches, but also plan how
to adapt when a data breach inevitably does occur.
Previous literature on data breaches has conceptualized the financial consequences
primarily from a consumer perspective. It has been argued that when a firm notifies its customers
of a data breach, customers’ perceived data vulnerability is heightened and leads to negative
psychological responses (Martin et al. 2017). Feelings associated with heightened data
vulnerability has been linked to negative word-of-mouth, decline in stock price, and decrease in
customer spending (Martin et al. 2017; Janakiraman et al. 2018).
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In this research, I examine the financial consequences of data breaches from the investor
perspective. I find that in addition to the direct financial consequences, data breaches can
spillover to affect the financial returns from subsequent firm actions. I draw from signaling
theory, which posits that investors, in order to optimize their trading decisions, seek information
from their environment to reduce the information asymmetry with firms. Strategic signals, such
as patent announcements and executive hiring decisions, can then serve as cues to investors
about the firm’s unobservable qualities, such as an innovation project or an impending policy
change respectively. Against this theoretical background, I hypothesize that a prior data breach
that had affected the firm can remain in the environment as information to investors, which then
influences their interpretation of the firm’s subsequent signals.
I purposefully examine patent announcements and executive hiring decisions as signals
for two reasons. First, patent announcements and executive hiring decisions each signal firm
initiatives that are long-term oriented. As multiple signals are required to be transmitted
throughout the life of a long-term initiative, my research provides possible solutions to firms that
have experienced a data breach and require adjustments to their signaling routine. Second,
previous research documents that both signals per se are positively interpreted by investors. By
studying how otherwise positive signals can be negatively affected by a data breach, I capture the
full extent of the financial consequences of data breaches, and highlight the importance of
sending correct signals with respect to data breach-related and firm-related characteristics.
To empirically test my predictions, I construct a sample of data breach disclosures in the
financial and insurance services industry between January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2018 in the
United States. For the 72 firms in my sample of 135 data breach disclosures, I further collect
their patent announcements, and executive hiring decisions made within the same time window.
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As my research focuses on shareholder value, I use the event study methodology to calculate the
abnormal returns from data breaches, patent announcements, and executive hiring decisions, to
examine each of their determinants.
Analysis of the abnormal returns from data breaches reveals that in accordance with
attribution, data breaches caused by internal perpetrators lead to worse financial outcomes
compared to data breaches caused by external perpetrators. In addition, positive firm reputation
attenuates the negative abnormal returns from data breaches, indicating an insurance-like effect
that buffers financial harm. Independent analyses of returns from patent announcements and
executive hiring decisions reveal that positive firm reputation, which is associated with signal
credibility, can overall increase the signals’ financial returns. Due to differences in signal
interpretation, I find that the recency of prior data breaches increases the returns from executive
hiring decisions, but decreases the returns from patent announcements.
It is important to note that I do not assert patent announcements and executive hiring
decisions are made specifically in response to a data breach. Rather, the objective is to
demonstrate that firms should consider the information in their environment prior to signaling to
investors. As my sample consists of firms that have specifically experienced a data breach, I
generalize my findings and implications to the corresponding population of firms.
This work contributes to the extant literature in three ways. First, previous research has
primarily focused on the direct financial harm from data breaches. I contribute by additionally
studying the indirect consequences from the perspective of investors. I theorize that due to signal
calibration, data breaches can affect the financial returns of the afflicted firm’s signals. This
suggests that the total consequences from data breaches are much larger than previously
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anticipated, and that the relevant mitigation plans for firms should involve more than addressing
technical problems directly related to the data breach.
Second, I extend the literature on signal calibration to the context of data breaches. I
provide the theoretical importance of firm-related and data breach-related characteristics that
affect the interpretation of firm signals by investors. From this, I provide managerial implications
to optimize shareholder value from signaling routines, such as patent announcements and
executive hiring decisions, for firms that have previously experienced a data breach.
Finally, I contribute to the literature on firm reputation. With respect to public crises and
scandals, previous research posits two potential effects of positive reputation. The first is an
insurance-like effect, in which the accrued goodwill serves as a buffer to attenuate the negative
financial harm. The second is a spotlight effect, in which positive reputation leads to greater
expectations from the firm’s stakeholders. Consequently, a public crisis, such as a data breach
can lead to a greater sense of violation and worsen its associated financial consequences. In this
research, I find that positive firm reputation not only serves as a buffer to the direct financial
harm from data breaches, but also increases the financial returns from subsequent signals by
strengthening the firm’s signal credibility.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. First, I review the previous literature
to develop a theoretical framework based on signaling theory, conceptualizing the consequences
of data breaches from the perspective of investors. Next, I theorize the link between data
breaches and firm signaling to formulate my hypotheses. I then describe my empirical setting
and data, along with the relevant measures of independent variables. I then discuss the event
study methodology and model specifications, followed by the results. I conclude the essay with a
discussion of managerial implications and limitations.
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
Previous research in marketing theorizes the consequences of data breaches primarily from the
perspective of consumers. Particularly, Martin et al. (2017) use gossip theory to explain that
consumers’ psychological responses to a data breach is similar to that of being a target of an
evaluative communication by others. Becoming a target of gossip elicits negative feelings
associated with violation of trust and betrayal (Martin et al. 2017). Likewise, receiving a
notification that an unauthorized party has breached the firm’s data increases the perception of
vulnerability in the firm’s customers, subsequently leading to behaviors that generate negative
word-of-mouth and financial harm (Martin et al. 2017). In accordance with this customer
perspective, Janakiraman et al. (2018) find in the retailing context that customers’ heightened
perception of data vulnerability leads to decrease in spending and increase in channel-switching
behaviors.
In this research, I take the perspective of investors when conceptualizing the financial
consequences of data breaches. My objective is to examine whether the financial returns from
strategic firm actions, specifically patent announcements and executive hiring decisions, are
affected by data breaches experienced by the corresponding firm. I draw from signaling theory to
argue that the knowledge that a firm has previously experienced a data breach remains in the
environment as information for investors, subsequently calibrating the valence of signals that
firms may strategically release.
Signaling Theory
To optimize the return on investment, investors seek from their environment diagnostic
information that can distinguish between high-quality and low-quality firms. However,
information asymmetry is at the heart of the relationship between investors and firms, as

59

investors are unable to access private or insider information held by firms (Myers and Majluf
1984). Information asymmetry poses problems for both parties, as it is also in the interests of
high-quality firms to distinguish themselves from low-quality firms, in order to maximize their
shareholder value. In this theoretical setting, high-quality firms then become signalers that
attempt to communicate information or cues about their unobservable qualities to investors, who
then become receivers of the signals (Connelly et al. 2011).
This framework based on signaling has been applied by previous research to explain
various strategic firm behaviors. For example, Eliashberg and Robertson (1988) examine
preannouncements of new products as a signal to consumers who might consider adopting the
new product in the near future. Swaminathan and Moorman (2009) examine reputation in firm
networks as a signal to investors about the firm’s knowledge and skills in managing firm
alliances. Joshi and Hanssens (2010) examine advertising as a signal to investors about the firm’s
financial well-being and competitive capability. Kim and McAlister (2011) extend the previous
work by proposing that advertising can also strategically signal the firm’s future cashflows to
investors.
In the context of data breaches, I examine two particular firm signals: patent
announcements, and executive hiring decisions. My focus on these signals is driven by two
reasons. First, patent announcements and executive hiring decisions each signal firm initiatives
that are long-term oriented. For firms to realize the full financial returns from their investment in
either innovation or a newly hired executive requires a significant amount of time, in which the
returns are slowly accrued (Sood and Tellis 2009; Schwartz and Menon 1985). This highlights
the importance for the firm to develop an effective signaling routine that maximizes shareholder
value, implemented until the full returns are realized. I argue that an effective signaling routine
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must consider the impact of a prior data breach. Second, previous research documents that both
firm actions are interpreted as positive signals of firm quality by investors. By examining how a
prior data breach can negatively calibrate these otherwise positive signals, I capture the full
extent of the financial consequences of data breaches. This also highlights the importance for
firms to consider prior data breaches when designing and transmitting their signals to investors.
Below, I discuss each of the two firm signals independently, and then how a prior data breach
can change their degree of valence.
Patent announcements. Innovation births new products, fuels growth, and is often
necessary for firms to simply remain as incumbents in a market. Sood and Tellis (2009) define
an innovation project as “the total of a firm’s activities in researching, developing, and
introducing any new product based on a new technology.” Various firm activities constitute an
innovation project, and they can each be categorized into one of three phases: initiation, which
includes activities such as obtaining grants and new manufacturing facilities, development, which
includes patents and product prototypes, and commercialization, which includes product
launches (Sood and Tellis 2009). Innovation projects require a substantial amount of time and
resources to initiate and develop (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). As the progress of an innovation
project is unobservable to investors, firms with high-quality innovation projects can rely on
signaling to reduce the information asymmetry. In this research, I focus on patent
announcements because it belongs in the development phase of an innovation project, which is
documented to have the largest effect on financial returns (Sood and Tellis 2009). This implies
that patent announcements as a signal are unambiguously interpreted as positive by investors.
Although withholding the progress of innovation activities from the public, which
competitors have access, can be beneficial for firms to obtain a competitive advantage,
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disclosure can also be beneficial in providing legitimacy and reducing transaction costs for the
firm (Simeth and Raffo 2013). Furthermore, specific investments and capabilities are essential
for the firm for scientific disclosure. For example, trained researchers with knowledge of the
patent filing process, as well as balancing the benefits and drawbacks of disclosing an innovation
project are necessary (Simeth and Lhuillery 2015). Therefore, I conceptualize patent
announcements as voluntary signals, the content and timing of which can be designed by the
firm.
Executive hiring decisions. I broadly define executives as top-level management roles.
Previous research suggests that investors pay close attention to the appointments of executives,
such as Chairman, Presidents, and C-suite, as they are responsible for oversight and formulation
of strategies with respect to the overarching goals of the firm (Varadarajan and Clark 1994).
Because of the significant resources and expertise that each executive brings to the firm, a new
appointment signals to investors an impending policy change or a new corporate direction (Nath
and Mahajan 2011). This signal is positively interpreted by investors, as Davidson et al. (1990)
suggest that investors perceive the new executive appointment will lead to a positive difference
for the firm. Accordingly, the new appointments of Chairman, Presidents, and Chief Executives
have a positive effect on financial returns (Davidson et al. 1990; Furtado and Rozeff 1987).
I do not assert that executive hiring decisions are made as a direct response to data
breaches. The appointments of new executives are made routinely by firms to alter their strategy,
internal structures or processes, as well as in response to problems that require special skills
(Davidson et al. 1990; Schwartz and Menon 1985). My argument is rather that their financial
returns are moderated by a prior data breach, and I provide implications with regards to the
design and timing of the announcements related to the hiring decision.
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I next discuss how these two positive signals are calibrated by a prior data breach, and
then formulate hypotheses for empirical testing.
Hypothesis Development
Signal calibration. It is important to note that meaning is not intrinsic to a signal—signals have
to be observed and interpreted by the receiver. Consequently, the environment in which the
signal is transmitted can contain other information that either strengthens or weakens the signal
for receivers. In this research, I define signal calibration as the change in degree of valance
associated with a signal due to information present in the external environment. Against this
theoretical background, I formulate my hypotheses, which I present visually in Figure 6 below.
Figure 6. Conceptual Framework
A. Effect of Data Breach on Shareholder Value
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B. Effect of Firm Signals on Shareholder Value

Signal calibration occurs when information in the environment is combined with the
transmitted signal to affect the signal’s interpretation in the minds of receivers. For example,
university rankings may serve as a signal for prospective students about the quality of a potential
university, but opinions from student peers may alter the valence of the signal (Connelly et al.
2011). Rynes et al. (1991) examine signal calibration in the context of job recruitment, finding
that timing is an important factor for recruiters to manage. Specifically, delays in the recruitment
process can generate negative inferences for the job candidate that calibrate the initial, otherwise
positive signals that the recruiter may have previously sent to the candidate (Rynes et al. 1991).
Significant events that impact the firm may also serve as information for investors. For
example, Park and Mezias (2005) examine firm alliance announcements made before and after
the technology sector crash in 2000, revealing that the financial returns from announcements
made after the crash were lower. The authors explain that firm alliances signal capability at times
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of high environmental munificence (i.e., before the crash), but weakness at times of low
environmental munificence (i.e., after the crash; Park and Mezias 2005). Gao et al. (2015)
examine advertising expenditure as a signal specifically before a product recall announcement,
finding that advertising, which serves as a positive signal of future cashflows, serves as a buffer
to the impending negative news. Data breaches are also detrimental events, previously
conceptualized as infractions of the social contract and as service failures to the afflicted firm’s
customers (Janakiraman et al. 2018; Malhotra and Malhotra 2011). I hypothesize that data
breaches can calibrate signals that firms transmit to investors, and that the calibration depends on
data breach-related and firm-related characteristics: attribution and timing associated with the
data breach, and reputation of the firm.
Attribution of breach. Previous research has viewed firms merely as victims of a data
breach (Janakiraman et al. 2018). I argue by drawing from attribution theory that investors can
attribute the cause of a data breach to the firm, rather than just to an external factor beyond the
firm’s control. Attribution theory explains how an observer gathers and combines information to
arrive at a causal explanation for an event (Fiske and Taylor 1991). In this line of research, a
distinction is made between internal and external causes for events. For example, Phares (1957)
examines attribution in the context of achievement with respect to skill and chance. When
experimental subjects were told that their success on a given task was due to skill, the subjects
forecasted higher achievement in the future task, compared to subjects who were told that their
success on the task was due to luck (Phares 1957). Because skill is an attribute that is internal to
subjects, successes on the task were attributed to the subjects themselves. On the other hand,
since luck is an attribute that is external to subjects, successes were attributed to factors deemed
beyond the subjects’ control (Kelley and Michela 1980).

65

In accordance with attribution theory, I hypothesize that investors can attribute the cause
of a data breach based on whether the perpetrator is internal or external to the afflicted firm. If
the perpetrator is internal to the firm (e.g., a rogue employee), the cause of the data breach can be
associated with suspect firm characteristics, such as poor employee training and absence of
appropriate protocols. Conversely, a data breach caused by an external perpetrator (e.g., a
hacker) lacks association with characteristics that are internal to the afflicted firm, and is likely to
be attributed to factors beyond the firm’s control. Therefore, I hypothesize that a data breach
caused by an internal perpetrator will lead to greater financial harm than data breaches caused by
an external perpetrator.
k;< : Data breach caused by an internal perpetrator leads to greater financial harm than data
breach caused by an external perpetrator.
I propose that transmitting a positive signal (e.g., patent announcement, executive hiring
decision) after the disclosure of an attributable data breach leads to signal incongruence. Signal
incongruence occurs when positive and negative signals associated with the same subject come
into conflict. In such an instance, previous research predicts that the negative signal will receive
greater attention in the minds of receivers because negative information is perceived as more
diagnostic than positive information about a subject (Skowronski and Carlston 1989; Vergne et
al. 2018). For example, Vergne et al. (2018) find that when firms were revealed to have
overcompensated their executives after engaging in corporate philanthropy, the firms received
greater disapproval from the media. In accordance with signal incongruence, I hypothesize that a
data breach caused by an internal perpetrator will lead to the attenuation of financial returns from
subsequent patent announcements, or executive hiring decisions.
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k;= : Prior data breach caused by an internal perpetrator leads to attenuation in the financial
returns from patent announcements.
k;> : Prior data breach caused by an internal perpetrator leads to attenuation in the financial
returns from executive hiring decisions.
Recency of breach. The temporal information of how far back in the past a data breach
had occurred relative to the focal firm signal can influence signal calibration. Previous research
documents the prevalence of recency bias, which is a cognitive bias that places greater
importance for recent events when forecasting the future (Kunreuther et al. 2002). Accordingly,
recency can make the prior data breach more salient in the minds of investors, and affect the
degree of signal calibration. For patent announcements and executive hiring decisions, I
hypothesize two different effects of data breach recency, which I discuss individually below.
As previously discussed, innovation projects incur substantial amounts of risks and
resources to complete (Sood and Tellis 2009). Signaling the progress of an innovation project
soon after a data breach may not be positively received because an inadequate amount of time
had been made available for the firm to recover. The recovery from a data breach involves
various costs from identifying and repairing the damages, monitoring the servers for future
breaches, acquiring new customers, and resolving legal fines (Martin et al. 2017). It is estimated
that 39 percent of the total costs are incurred more than a year after the data breach had taken
place (Ponemon Institute 2020). Thus, by announcing a patent soon after a data breach, investors
may perceive that the firm is pursuing untimely risks by advancing its innovation project.
Furthermore, due to recency bias, investors may forecast that pursuing such risks may result in
the firm increasing the likelihood of another data breach in the future, and the innovation project
experiencing less than anticipated cashflows when it is later commercialized as a consequence of
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the data breach. In sum, I hypothesize that the more recent a data breach is, the smaller the
financial returns from the subsequent patent announcement.
k?< : The more recent a data breach is, the smaller the financial returns from the subsequent
patent announcement.
A data breach is a firm crisis that requires a comprehensive response from management
to address (Malhotra and Malhotra 2011). In responding to a data breach, firms can bring
together short-term and long-term remedies. For example, the identification and containment of a
data breach can be viewed as short-term remedies, whereas the improvement of employee
training and implementation of new policies to securely handle customer data can be viewed as
long-term remedies.
Investors are prone to assigning blame to executives for organizational problems
(Arthaud-Day et al. 2006). Since a new executive appointment signals to investors an impending
policy change, a recent data breach can subsequently strengthen the signal when interpreted as a
long-term remedy. In accordance with this conjecture, previous research indicates that changes in
top management are perceived as critical determinants of an organization’s adaptive behaviors,
and potential solutions to organizational problems (Schwartz and Menon 1985). Moreover, I
argue based on recency bias that the more recent a prior data breach is to the executive hiring
decision, the more salient the data breach is in the minds of investors. This leads to an easier
formation of the link between the data breach as a crisis, and the newly hired executive as a
potential remedy. Thus, I hypothesize that for executive hiring decisions, the recency of data
breach will increase their financial returns.
k?= : The more recent a data breach is, the greater the financial returns from the subsequent
executive hiring decision.
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Firm reputation. There are numerous determinants of firm reputation, such as financial
performance, corporate social responsibility, and successful delivery of promises (Deephouse
and Carter 2005; Christensen and Raynor 2013; Balmer 1997). Previous research conceptualizes
reputation as an intangible asset or goodwill that consists of two dimensions: the firm’s
perceived capability to produce and deliver high quality products, and the firm’s prominence in
the minds of its stakeholders (Rindova et al. 2005). In this research, my primary focus is on the
latter dimension, and define reputation as “the public recognition and social approval of an
organization” (Zavyalova et al. 2016). Consequently, to manage high firm reputation, it is critical
to safeguard how society and stakeholders perceive the firm (Hogarth et al. 2018).
As an intangible asset, reputation can have an insurance-like effect for firms. For
example, Love and Kraatz (2009) find that high reputation can benefit the firm after corporate
downsizing, which in itself signals opportunism and lack of communal commitment, by
buffering these negative perceptions. Pfarrer et al. (2010) find that firms with high reputation
experienced lighter financial consequences after disclosing negative earnings. Luo and
Bhattacharya (2009) find that building a positive perception of the firm through corporate social
responsibility leads to moral capital that lowers firm-idiosyncratic risk. In accordance with this
stream of research, I hypothesize that firm reputation will serve to attenuate the direct financial
harm from a data breach.
k@< : Positive firm reputation attenuates the direct financial consequences from a data breach.
In the signaling context, positive reputation of the signaler can strengthen signal
credibility. Signal credibility can be broadly defined as “whether the signal can be trusted” by its
receivers (Connelly et al. 2016). Positive reputation is accrued over time through repeated
interactions between the firm and its stakeholders, where the firm manages to consistently satisfy
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its stakeholders’ expectations (Zavyalova et al. 2016). As a result, signals from firms with a
positive reputation are more likely to be perceived as trustworthy by investors, in that the
signaler will likely meet the signaled expectations. When risk and uncertainty are particularly
salient for investors after a data breach, I argue that investors will rely on firm reputation to
gauge signal credibility. Thus, I hypothesize that positive firm reputation increases the financial
returns from firm signals made subsequent to a data breach.
k@= : Positive firm reputation increases the financial returns from patent announcements
made by firms that have experienced a data breach.
k@> : Positive firm reputation increases the financial returns from executive hiring decisions
made by firms that have experienced a data breach.

3.4 Method and Data
Event Study
As my research takes the perspective of investors and focuses on shareholder value, I examine
financial abnormal returns as the dependent variable. The derivation of abnormal returns is based
on the event study methodology, widely used in financial and accounting research (Sorescu et al.
2017). The theoretical underpinning for event studies is the efficient market hypothesis, which
posits that stock prices at a certain point in time reflect all publicly available information that are
relevant to investors’ trading decisions (Fama et al. 1969). As such, fluctuations of stock price
for a given firm under the efficient market hypothesis reflect investors interpreting newly
revealed information and adjusting their expectations about the firm’s discounted future
cashflows. The event study allows me to examine how patent announcements and executive
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hiring decisions made after a data breach are interpreted by investors, which in turn affect
shareholder value.
I use the market model to estimate abnormal returns, following conventional practice in
finance and methodological recommendations, which has shown the consistency of the market
model using simulations (Sorescu et al. 2017; Brown and Warner 1985). Thus, abnormal returns
from an event (i.e., either a data breach, patent announcement, or executive hiring decision) can
be expressed as follows:
X', = Y', − (Hl' + 0mA YB, )

(3.1)

where X', is the abnormal return, and Y', the observed price for stock i on day t. The event date
is set as t = 0. YB, is the return from the CRSP equally weighted index for day t (Brown and
Warner 1985), and Hl' and 0mA are the parameters from the estimation period, the length of which I
specify as maximum of 255 days, and ends 46 days before the event.
A concern associated with event studies is known as event uncertainty (Flammer 2013).
Event uncertainty casts doubt on whether the fluctuation of a stock price on a given date can be
attributed to the event that is disclosed to the public. For example, a patent announcement could
be made on day t, but in the evening after the stock market had closed. This would result in the
information of the announcement to be reflected in the stock price the following day (i.e., t + 1,
not t). Alternatively, information leakage may occur where a number of investors could receive
information about an announcement earlier than the general public via unobservable channels.
To address these concerns, I estimate the abnormal returns from three separate windows for a
given event. In addition to the returns from the single event day t = 0 (i.e., [0, 0]), I estimate the
cumulative returns from the two-day window (i.e., [−1, 0]), and the three-day window (i.e.,
[−1, 1]). I calculate the cumulative abnormal returns ]XY' for stock i as follows:
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)

]XY' [−q, <] = Q X',

(3.2)

,$(B

where -m and n denote the [−q, <] event window, encompassing t = 0.
Sample
Data breach announcements. To study the impact of data breaches on subsequent firm signals, I
foremost require a sample of firms that have experienced a data breach, and the dates that each of
the breaches were disclosed to the public. I obtain the necessary data from Privacy Rights
Clearing House (PRCH), which is a non-profit organization that monitors data breach disclosures
in the United States. I focus on firms in the financial and insurance services industry as classified
by PRCH for two reasons. First, according to the 2019 Ninth Annual Cost of Cybercrime Study
by Accenture, the financial services industry incurred the highest costs related to cybercrime
among all industries.12 Second, the nature of customer data in this industry is particularly
sensitive, but plays an important role in the day-to-day operations for firms from customer
relationship management to new product innovation (Gomber et al. 2018).
From PRCH, I collected the data breach disclosures from publicly-traded firms in the
United States between January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2018. I also collected the descriptions
that accompany each of the breach disclosures, which detail the nature and cause of the data
breach if known at the time. This resulted in a tentative sample of 174 data breach disclosures
from 94 firms.
I then matched this tentative sample with the risk ratings collected from RepRisk.
RepRisk is a business intelligence service that specializes in assessing environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) risks of firms. By aggregating over 80,000 news sources, RepRisk monitors

12

https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-96/Accenture-2019-Cost-of-Cybercrime-Study-Final.pdf#zoom=50
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negative media coverage related to 28 ESG issues for over 160,000 international firms, assigning
each firm a proprietary letter rating (see Appendix A for the list of issues monitored by
RepRisk). These ratings resemble standard credit ratings, where AAA reflects the safest, while D
the riskiest. I subsequently use these ratings as a measure of firm reputation. Firms in my sample
that were not monitored by RepRisk were dropped, yielding the final sample of 135 data breach
disclosures from 72 firms.
Patent announcements. Patent announcements made between January 1, 2010 to
December 31, 2018 by firms in the data breach sample were collected from Factiva, a major
database that aggregates news articles from numerous sources. On Factiva, the search terms
“Patent Issued” were used for each company name and subject set to “patent” when searching for
all the patent announcements made within the sample time window. When multiple media
publications existed for the same patent, only the one with the earliest date was collected. Given
my focus on patent announcements subsequent to a data breach, I only collected patent
announcements that were made after the earliest data breach disclosure for each company,
resulting in a total of 6,541 patent announcement dates for 47 firms.
Executive hiring decisions. Executive hiring decisions made between January 1, 2010 to
December 31, 2018 by firms in the data breach sample were collected from BoardEx, which is a
data provider that consolidates information regarding board members and senior management of
international firms. Similar to the procedure for patent announcements, I focus on hiring
decisions that were made after the earliest data breach disclosure for each company. As my focus
is on executive management roles in the United States, I removed hiring announcements related
to divisional and regional positions outside the United States. Moreover, I removed
announcements related to Emeritus roles, and dates when multiple hiring decisions were made to
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avoid confounding with unobservable corporate events, such as firm acquisitions, divestitures,
and restructuring. Thus, I obtained a total of 228 executive hiring decisions made by 47 firms.
Dependent Variables
For each of the three events in my sample, I estimate the abnormal returns that will serve as
dependent variables for my multivariate analyses. Table 9 shows the average CAR for the
prespecified event windows of each event.
Table 9. Average Abnormal Returns
Event Window

Mean Cumulative
Abnormal Returns

[0, 0]
[−1, 0]
[−1, 1]

-0.13%
-0.34%
-0.52%

[0, 0]
[−1, 0]
[−1, 1]

0.02%
-0.01%
0.03%

[0, 0]
[−1, 0]
[−1, 1]

0.08%
0.08%
-0.07%

A: Data Breach
Standardized
Cross-Sectional Zstatistic
-1.538*
-2.280**
-2.037**
B: Patent
1.676*
-0.184
1.123
C: Executive Hiring
0.573
0.070
-1.020

N
135
135
135

Multivariate
Analysis
F-statistic
0.950
1.366
1.446*

6,541
6,541
6,541

1.202
1.167
1.387**

228
228
228

1.151
1.160
1.451**

* p < 0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

I find in Section A of Table 1 that the average CAR of data breaches is negative and
statistically significant, consistent with prior research (Martin et al. 2017). However, the
statistical significance of CAR from patent announcements is inconsistent, and that of executive
hiring decisions is nonsignificant. I note that in my context, the statistical significance of CAR
for patent announcements and executive hiring decisions per se are relatively less meaningful.
Whereas previous research finds that the two events from a random sample of firms have a
positive and statistically significant effect on abnormal returns (e.g., Boyd et al. 2010; Sood and
Tellis 2009; Austin 1993), my sample of events is non-random, consisting of those from firms
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that have experienced a data breach. Given the hidden moderators that I subsequently examine, I
attribute greater theoretical meaning to the subsequent multivariate analyses where I examine indepth how the CAR of these events are affected by prior data breaches. My sample allows me to
generalize my results not to the average firm, but to the specific population of firms that have
experienced a data breach. From the three specified event-windows in Table 9, I select for
multivariate analysis the window that yields a statistically significant F-statistic with my model
specification.
Independent Variables
Firm reputation. I measure firm reputation using the monthly-level letter ratings collected
from RepRisk. To transform the letter ratings into an ordinal variable RiskRating, I use the
coding scheme shown in Table 10. I find that the distribution of average RiskRating in my data
breach sample, as visualized in Figure 7, provides adequate variance to examine the moderating
role of firm reputation with respect to data breaches.

Table 10. Coding Scheme for Risk Rating
Rating
AAA
AA
A
BBB
BB
B
CCC
CC
C

Coding
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Note: AAA reflects the safest, while C the riskiest firm with respect to ESG factors.
“C” is the lowest rating in my sample.
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Figure 7. Distribution of Average Risk Rating

Attribution of breach. Based on the descriptions of data breaches provided by PRCH, I
manually code the causes of data breaches based on the coding scheme shown in Table 11.
Table 11. Coding Scheme for Attribution of Data Breach
Internal Perpetrator

External Perpetrator

Unintended Disclosures

Third-party Hacker

Rogue Employee or Insider

Skimming Devices at POS Terminals

Unidentified Cause

Theft of Physical Storage Devices

I create Internal, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the perpetrator of the
data breach is internal to the firm. As discussed in my theoretical framework, I argue that the
cause of a data breach is attributable to the firm if the perpetrator is internal (e.g., insider,
employee) rather than external (e.g., third-party hacker) to the firm. Of the 135 data breaches in
my sample, I find that the cause of seven data breaches were described as unknown. I code these
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breaches as attributable to the firm because they signal to investors flaws or incompetence in
identifying and rectifying the source of the data breach.
When analyzing the abnormal returns of patent announcements and executive hiring
decisions, I use InternalPast, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the most recent
data breach prior to the focal event (i.e., patent or executive hiring announcement) is attributable
to the firm (i.e., Internal = 1).
Recency of breach. Particularly for patent announcements and executive hiring decisions,
I measure the recency of the prior data breach using DaysSinceBreach, which is the number of
days between the focal event and the most recent data breach. Therefore, an increase in
DaysSinceBreach indicates that the most recent data breach had occurred much further back in
time, relative to the focal event. I find in my sample that the average DaysSinceBreach for patent
announcements is 1,004 days, and that for executive hiring decisions is 848 days.
Finally, I measure the number of data breaches that a firm has experienced using
BreachCount, the number of patent announcements made by a firm using PatentCount, and the
number of executive hiring decisions made by a firm using HiringCount.
Control variables. I control for firm size (FirmSize) using the natural logarithm of the
number of employees. Furthermore, I control for firm profitability (Profitability) using return on
assets, which is the ratio of net income to total assets of a firm, and control for innovation
intensity (InnovationIntensity) using the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales. The data for each of
these control variables were collected from COMPUSTAT. In accordance with previous
research, missing values were coded as 0 (Borah and Tellis 2014). Finally, I control for potential
unobserved heterogeneity by using firm- and year-specific dummy variables. The complete list
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of independent variables, descriptions, and sources are presented in Table 12, and the summary
statistics of the data breach sample in Table 13.
Table 12: Variable Descriptions and Sources
Variable
RiskRating

Description
Ordinal variable of firm reputation based on negative media
coverage related to environmental, social, and governance
issues associated with the firm.

Source
RepRisk

Internal

Indicator variable that equals one if the cause of the data
breach is attributable to the firm.

Privacy Rights
Clearing House

InternalPast

Indicator variable that equals one if the cause of the most
recent data breach to an event of interest is attributable to
the firm.

Privacy Rights
Clearing House

DaysSinceBreach

Number of days since the last data breach prior to an event
of interest.

Privacy Rights
Clearing House

BreachCount

Number of data breaches experienced by the affected firm
up to the event of interest.

Privacy Rights
Clearing House

PatentCount

Number of patent announcements released by the focal firm
up to the event of interest.

Factiva

HiringCount

Number of appointments to executive or corporate board by
the focal firm up to the event of interest.

BoardEx

FirmSize

Natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm.

COMPUSTAT

Profitability

Return on assets (i.e., net income/sales).

COMPUSTAT

InnovationIntensity

Proportion of R&D expenditure to sales.

COMPUSTAT

Table 13. Summary Statistics of Data Breach Sample
RiskScore
Internal
BreachCount
FirmSize
InnovationIntensity
Profitability

Mean
6.09
0.54
2.24
3.23
0.01
0.06

Std. Dev
2.08
0.50
1.95
1.77
0.04
0.08
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Min
2
0
1
0
0
-0.24

Max
9
1
10
5.67
0.20
0.40

Model Specification
To test my hypotheses, I specify separate models of CAR for data breaches, patent
announcements, and executive hiring decisions. First, to examine whether firm reputation and
attribution of data breach moderate the direct financial consequences of data breaches, I estimate
the following equation:

]XY' = 0! + 00 YrstYubr<v' + 01 L<bwx<uy' + 02 zxwuAℎ]|}<b' + ~′ÄC + ɛ'

(3.3)

where i denotes data breach disclosures as the unit of analysis. The dependent variable is ]XY'
over the [−1, 1] event window, which has a statistically significant F-statistic with the above
model specification. X is the matrix of control variables, and ɛ' is the idiosyncratic error term.
Coefficients 0 are estimated using ordinary-least squares.
To estimate whether a prior data breach affects the CAR from subsequent patent
announcements and executive hiring decisions, I estimate the following separate equations:

]XY% = 3! + 30 YrstYubr<v% + 31 L<bwx<uy[usb% + 32 zxwuAℎ]|}<b% + 33 [ubw<b]|}<b%
+ 34 Wu=sKr<AwzxwuAℎ% + Ç′Ä% + É%

(3.4)

]XYB = >! + >0 YrstYubr<vB + >1 L<bwx<uy[usbB + >2 zxwuAℎ]|}<bB + >3 arxr<v]|}<bB
+ >4 Wu=sKr<AwzxwuAℎB + Ñ′ÄB + ÖB

(3.5)

where j denotes patent announcements, and m denotes executive hiring decisions as the unit of
analysis. Coefficients 3 and > are also estimated using ordinary-least squares.
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3.5 Results
I begin with the results of Equation (3.3) to examine the determinants of abnormal returns from
data breaches. I report the main effects in column 1, and the estimates with an interaction term in
column 2 of Table 14.
Table 14. Determinants of Returns from Data Breaches
(1)
0.356
(0.878)

(2)
0.128
(0.858)

RiskRating ×
BreachCount

-

-0.002**
(0.001)

RiskRating

0.010**
(0.005)
-0.016*
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.010
(0.035)
-2.684
(7.229)
-0.098
(0.355)

0.017***
(0.006)
-0.015*
(0.008)
0.004
(0.005)
0.008
(0.035)
-1.784
(7.017)
-0.133
(0.344)

Intercept

Internal
BreachCount
FirmSize
InnovationIntensity
Profitability
N
Adjusted R-squared
Firm Dummies
Year Dummies

135
0.220
Yes
Yes

0.268
Yes
Yes

* p < 0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.
The main parameters of interest are Internal and RiskRating. In column 1, I find that the
main effect of Internal is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.10), which provides support
for a!D , that data breaches attributable to the firm leads to greater financial harm. I additionally
find that the effect of RiskRating is positive and significant (p < 0.05), which provides support
for a1D , that positive firm reputation attenuates the financial harm from data breaches.
In column 2, I examine the interaction between RiskRating and BreachCount to further
explore the insurance-like effect of firm reputation. I find that the interaction term is negative
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and significant (p < 0.05), indicating that additional data breaches experienced by the firm
reduces the positive buffer effect from firm reputation.
I next examine the results of Equation (3.4), which models the relationship between CAR
of patent announcements and prior data breaches. The main effects are report in column 1, and
the estimates with interaction terms in column 2 of Table 15. In column 1, I find that
DaysSinceBreach is positive and significant (p < 0.05), providing support for a0D , that the
greater the amount of time between the patent announcement and the data breach, the larger the
financial returns. Since the average CAR from patent announcements in my sample is 0.0003, I
use the coefficient of DaysSinceBreach to calculate that the percentage increase of CAR by
delaying a patent announcement by 30 days is approximately 30 percent. In addition, I find that
RiskRating is also positive and significant (p < 0.10), providing support for a1E , that firm
reputation increases the returns from signals subsequent to a data breach. The main effect of
InternalPast is statistically nonsignificant, which does not provide support to a!E .
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Table 15. Determinants of Returns from Patent Announcements
(1)
-0.022
(0.021)
-

(2)
-0.034
(0.021)
-0.001**
(2.25e-4)

PatentCount ×
InternalPast

-

-7.81e-6***
(2.19e-6)

DaysSinceBreach

2.96e-6**
(1.25e-6)

2.71e-6**
(1.28e-6)

RiskRating

0.001*
(4.12e-4)

0.001**
(5.33e-4)

InternalPast

-0.003
(0.002)

-0.004
(0.002)

BreachCount

0.001
(0.001)

0.003***
(0.001)

PatentCount

4.15e-6
(2.56e-6)
0.003
(0.004)

8.42e-6***
(2.97e-6)
0.005
(0.004)

InnovationIntensity

0.063
(0.040)

0.050
(0.041)

Profitability

0.004
(0.013)

0.005
(0.014)

Intercept
RiskRating ×
BreachCount

FirmSize

N
Adjusted R-squared
Firm Dummies
Year Dummies

6,541
0.004
Yes
Yes

0.006
Yes
Yes

* p < 0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.
In column 2, I find that the interaction between RiskRating and BreachCount is negative
and significant (p < 0.05). This is consistent with the results from Equation (3.3), which
indicates depletion of the buffer from positive reputation with additional data breaches
experienced by the firm. I also examine the interaction between InternalPast and PatentCount to
explore whether the frequency of patent announcements is affected by the attribution of data
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breach. I find that the interaction is negative and significant (p < 0.01), indicating that
continuously announcing new patents after an attributable data breach leads to smaller financial
returns.
I finally examine the results of Equation (3.5) that models the determinants of CAR from
executive hiring decisions made after a data breach. I present the main effects in column 1, and
the model with interaction terms in column 2 of Table 16. In column 1, I find that the main effect
of RiskRating is positive and significant (p < 0.05), which provides support for a1F , that positive
firm reputation increases the returns from executive hiring decisions after a data breach. As in
Equation (3.4), I find that the main effect of InternalPast is statistically nonsignificant, which
does not support a!F . I also find that the main effect of DaysSinceBreach is statistically
nonsignificant.
In column 2, I examine the interaction between DaysSinceBreach and InternalPast,
finding that the effect is negative and significant (p < 0.10). This provides conditional support
for a0E ; the more recent a data breach that is specifically attributable to the firm, the greater the
returns from executive hiring decisions. Finally, I find consistent results with Equation (3.3) and
Equation (3.4), in that the interaction between RiskRating and BreachCount is negative and
significant (p < 0.01).
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Table 16. Determinants of Returns from Executive Hiring Decisions
Intercept
RiskRating ×
BreachCount
DaysSinceBreach ×
InternalPast
DaysSinceBreach
RiskRating
InternalPast
BreachCount
HireCount
FirmSize
InnovationIntensity
Profitability
N
Adjusted R-squared
Firm Dummies
Year Dummies

(1)
-0.066
(0.041)
-

(2)
-0.108**
(0.043)
-0.002***
(0.001)
-1.10e-5*
(5.71e-6)
-1.03e-6
(5.63e-6)
0.009***
(0.003)
0.013
(0.008)
0.002
(0.004)
1.00e-4
(0.001)
-0.010
(0.008)
-0.417
(0.712)
0.201*
(0.106)

-6.88e-6
(4.93e-6)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.006
(0.008)
-0.005**
(0.002)
2.18e-4
(0.001)
-0.010
(0.008)
-0.520
(0.730)
0.126
(0.104)
228
0.110
Yes
Yes

0.153
Yes
Yes

* p < 0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

3.6 Discussion
Whereas previous research primarily focuses on the direct financial harm of data breaches, I
additionally study the harm that can indirectly affect the financial returns from subsequent firm
signals. I draw from signaling theory to propose that prior data breaches serve as information to
investors that subsequently lead to signal calibration. To understand the signal calibration in
greater detail, I theorize and test the recency and attribution of data breaches, and reputation of
firms as moderators to the abnormal returns from data breach disclosures, patent announcements,
and executive hiring decisions.
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I foremost find that data breaches caused by perpetrators internal to the afflicted firm lead
to greater financial harm relative to those caused by external perpetrators. If the perpetrator is
internal to the firm, I theorize using attribution theory that the cause of the data breach can be
associated with unobservable firm characteristics by investors. On the other hand, external
perpetrators lack clear associations with the firm and the data breach is likely to be attributed to
factors beyond the firm’s control.
I also find that firm reputation is an important asset in the context of data breaches.
Positive reputation not only provides an insurance-like buffer to the direct negative harm from
data breaches, but also serves to increase the financial returns from subsequent firm signals. As
positive reputation is accrued over time by the firm consistently meeting its stakeholders’
expectations, I theorize that positive reputation can increase the firm’s signal credibility.
My research also indicates that timing of firm signals after a data breach is important. I
find that the recency of data breach decreases the financial returns from patent announcements,
but increases the returns from executive hiring decisions. Since innovation projects require a
substantial amount of time and resources, signaling its progress soon after a data breach may lead
to negative perceptions from investors. Specifically, investors may perceive that the firm is
pursuing untimely risks by advancing its innovation project. On the other hand, a new executive
appointment after a data breach signals to investors a long-term remedy, as investors are prone to
assigning blame to executives for organizational problems. Accordingly, I find that the more
recent an attributable data breach (i.e., caused by an internal perpetrator) is to the executive
hiring decision, the greater the financial returns.
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Managerial Implications
This research provides several implications for firms with respect to data security and signaling.
First, in addition to investments in data security from external threats, firms should invest in
security from internal threats. Since I find that the financial harm from data breaches caused by
internal perpetrators is greater, firms may benefit from strengthening their internal data security.
This may involve implementing new policies regarding the handling of data, and improving
employee training to minimize accidental data breaches.
Second, firms should consider the timing of their signals to investors with respect to the
prior data breaches that they have experienced. Signaling firm initiatives that involve a
substantial amount of risk, such as an innovation project, may financially benefit when it is timed
further after a data breach. On the other hand, appointments of new executives, which signal firm
initiatives related to long-term remedies for organizational problems, may financially benefit
when it is timed closer to a data breach.
Third, firms should invest and safeguard their reputation. A positive reputation provides
an insurance for the firm that can buffer the harm from a future data breach. As well, positive
reputation increases signal credibility, which can generate greater financial returns from
signaling after a data breach. Although firm reputation is a complex construct that is influenced
by various factors, I have measured reputation in this research using risk ratings derived from
ESG issues. Therefore, firms concerned with their reputation can monitor their ESG
performance, and ensure that they do not receive negative coverage by the media on such issues.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
I note limitations of this research, and outline potential directions for future research. The first
limitation stems from my measurement of firm reputation using ESG risks. Previous research
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conceptualizes firm reputation as consisting of two dimensions: the perceived capability to
produce high quality products, and the firm’s prominence in the minds of its stakeholders
(Rindova et al. 2005). The ESG risk ratings obtained from RepRisk capture the latter dimension,
but not the former. Thus, firm reputation that results from high-quality products and services are
not considered in this research. Future research can apply a more comprehensive measure of firm
reputation, and extend this research with respect to data breaches.
Second, this research examines how the financial returns of signals made subsequent to a
data breach are affected. Future research can examine potential signals that are available to the
firm prior to a data breach disclosure. Similar to the research of Gao et al. (2015), which
examines advertising as a signal before a product recall announcement, there may exist potential
signals that can soften the negative returns directly from a data breach disclosure. This would
broaden the number of signals available to the firm before and after a data breach disclosure.
Third, I only examine firms in the financial and insurance services industry. While this
restriction provides a strong test of the proposed theoretical framework because it reduces the
unobserved heterogeneity between firms, it may hinder the generalizability of results to other
industries. Future research may examine alternative industries based on the proposed signaling
framework.
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4. Final Remarks
With perfect information, consumers and investors could easily optimize their decision-making
processes. However, information asymmetry that arises due to the inaccessibility of information
regarding true quality constrains decision making to be based primarily on public information.
The main focus of this dissertation is to examine how leakages of information regarding quality,
either by voluntary or involuntary means, can benefit firms.
In Essay 1, I study involuntary information leakage between firms and consumers in the
movie industry. I find that the spoiling content of movie reviews, measured using the spoiler
intensity metric, has a positive association with box office revenue. Furthermore, this positive
spoiling effect is more prominent for movies with limited release, smaller advertising spending,
and moderate user ratings, and is stronger in earlier days after the movie’s release. The results
indicate that uncertainty reduction is the behavioral mechanism that is driving the positive
effect—potential moviegoers who are unsure about the quality of a movie can use spoilers to
reduce their uncertainty.
In Essay 2, I study voluntary information leakage between firms and investors in the
signaling context. In an investment setting, public information alone may be insufficient for
investors to clearly differentiate between high-quality and low-quality firms. High-quality firms
can then voluntarily signal their unobservable characteristics to investors using cues, such as
patent announcements and executive hiring decisions that signal the progress of an innovation
project and an impending policy change, respectively. I find that data breaches can alter the
investors’ interpretations of these signals. Specifically, the recency and attribution of data
breaches, and the reputation of firms moderate the financial returns from these signals by
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changing the degree of the signals’ valence. Thus, the research proposes that firms can carefully
design their signaling routine considering these moderators to maximize their shareholder value.
With the increasing digitalization that allows consumers to freely discuss their opinions
on online platforms and widely share news on social media, the information imbalance between
firms and consumers is becoming easier to bypass. For example, consumers can not only use
firm-generated advertisements to obtain product information, but also read online reviews
generated by other consumers to make more informed purchase decisions. The theme that is
shared between the two essays in this dissertation is that the reduction of information asymmetry
can be beneficial for firms. Even in the context of the movie industry, where conventional
wisdom suggests movies are better left unspoiled, I find that spoilers have a positive effect on
box office revenue due to the uncertainty reduction mechanism.
I hope to advance with this dissertation how in this environment, firms can effectively
respond to and manage information leakages. Essay 1 highlights that movies that instil greater
quality uncertainty, such as limited release movies, benefit the most from spoilers. This provides
recommendations for movie studios to forecast future box office revenue and adjust their
marketing mix in accordance with the amount of spoiling information online. Essay 2 highlights
that the environment in which signals are transmitted is important in shaping the signals’
meaning. This provides recommendations for firms that have experienced a data breach to
consider their reputation, timing of the signal, and attribution of the data breach prior to signaling
to investors. Taken together, firms stand to benefit by unambiguously addressing the quality
uncertainty in their stakeholders, be it consumers or investors.
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Figure A1. Pareto Chart of Spoiler Reviews for 993 Movies
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Figure A2. Model Performance of CTM and LDA
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Notes: Perplexity is a measure used in natural language processing to evaluate the performance of probability
models. Lower perplexity scores indicate better generalization performance (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003). We fit both
CTM and LDA on our corpus of movie reviews across a nine-topic window surrounding K = 61, which is the
optimal number of topics for our data based on the algorithm proposed in Lee and Mimno (2017). The comparison
of perplexity scores shows that CTM outperforms LDA, providing support for the use of CTM in this study.
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Table A1. Names and Representative Words of 61 Topics
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B. Complementary Analyses in the Measurement of Spoiler Intensity
B.1 Evidence on the Difference in Topics between Spoiler and Non-Spoiler Reviews
One presumption about IMDb’s review data is that the distribution of topics in spoiler reviews is
different from that in non-spoiler reviews because spoiler reviews allow sensitive plot-related
information while non-spoiler reviews do not. We test this presumption by running a logistic
regression, in which the outcome variable is the review type (i.e., 1 = spoiler, 0 = non-spoiler),
and predictors are the number of words in a review associated with each topic. We use a 10-fold
cross-validation to assess the predictive performance. The area under the ROC curve (AUC)
is .70, which is similar to the average AUC reported by previous research (Netzer, Lemaire, and
Herzenstein 2019). Thus, the topics from CTM include sufficient information to distinguish
between spoiler and non-spoiler reviews.
B.2 Validation of the Proposed Spoiler Intensity Metric
We test whether the proposed spoiler intensity metric is capable of capturing what we theorized
by examining whether it adequately agrees with human judgment in determining which review
spoils more for a movie. For simplicity, we focus on spoiler intensity at the review level, defined
as ∑$"%& "!" #"# . We randomly sample 100 movies from our sample that have at least four spoiler
reviews (approximately 84% of our movies). For each movie, we order all spoiler reviews based
on their spoiler intensity and then randomly sample one review from each quartile. This
procedure samples four spoiler reviews per movie. Finally, we use the sampled reviews to
randomly form two pairs of spoiler reviews for each movie, resulting in a total of 200 pairs of
spoiler reviews.
Using MTurk, we recruited three human coders for each pair of spoiler reviews. We
instructed each coder to read the spoiler reviews and indicate “Which of the two movie reviews
reveal more of the plot?” We present only the text of reviews, omitting other review information
such as username and rating to avoid potential confounders. We use the majority voting rule to
determine the review with more spoiling information as evaluated by human judges, and
compare the result with that determined by the spoiler intensity metric. We present one coded
pair of spoiler reviews from the movie The Wolverine as an example in Figure B1. We find an
overall agreement rate of 82.5%, which provides evidence for the validity of the proposed spoiler
intensity metric.
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B.3 Additional Robustness Checks to Spoiler Intensity from Non-Spoiler Reviews
We construct spoiler intensity using spoiler reviews in our main analyses under the assumption
that the majority of plot-related information is provided by spoiler reviews rather than nonspoiler reviews. As a robustness check, we relax this assumption to see whether results still hold
after controlling for the additional spoiler intensity from non-spoiler reviews.
We begin by considering an alternative intensity metric that aggregates spoiling
information from both spoiler and non-spoiler reviews. We denote the aggregate intensity metric
by $%&'%($&)!' () and calculate $%&'%($&)!' () using Equation (2.5) summing over all
reviews rather than spoiler reviews only. The mean of $%&'%($&)!' () and that of $%&'%($&)!'
(i.e., intensity of spoiler reviews) are 3.29 and 2.48 respectively, suggesting that spoiler reviews
contribute to the majority of aggregate intensity (2.48/3.29 = 75.4%). Column 1 of Table B1
reports the estimation results with $%&'%($&)!' () . Consistent with the uncertainty-reduction
mechanism, we find that $%&'%($&)!' () has a positive and statistically significant association
with box office revenue. The elasticity of aggregate intensity is .073, which is slightly larger than
the elasticity of spoiler intensity (.06), suggesting that our estimate of elasticity of spoiler
intensity is conservative.
As a further exploration, we examine whether the effect of intensity from spoiler reviews
and that from non-spoiler reviews are different. To do so, we include the log of intensity from
non-spoiler reviews, denoted by ln($%&'%($&) *+ ), into the regression, where
$%&'%($&)!' *+ = $%&'%($&)!' () − $%&'%($&)!' . As column 2 of Table B1 shows, the
elasticities of intensity from spoiler reviews and non-spoiler reviews are .074 and .058, and the
difference is not statistically significant (p = .428). These results indicate that the positive
association between spoiler intensity from spoiler reviews and box office revenue still holds after
controlling for the effect of intensity from non-spoiler reviews. In addition, the positive
coefficients of both $%&'%($&) and $%&'%($&) *+ suggest that the uncertainty-reduction
mechanism is in play by the plot-related information from both the spoiler and non-spoiler
reviews, despite the fact that spoiler reviews contain the majority of plot-related information.
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Figure B1. Coded Pair of Spoiler Reviews for The Wolverine
Text

Spoiler Review 1

Spoiler Review 2

This is the best Wolverine to date. It’s fast paced
full of action and the story keeps flowing with a
few good twists and turns. Hugh Jackman is
back to his best with a story following his past
present and future. It follows on from an event
in Logans past where he is given the chance to
have a taste of mortality but obviously at a price.
It is mostly set in Japan with stunning sequences
and breathtaking scenery. Without making it too
complicated the movie flows through the gears
and gives a few flashbacks to previous movies.
Whereas previous versions have lacked in
seriousness this movie maintains a good rhythm
throughout. With a good blend of martial arts,
samurais, mutants and robots yes that’s right
robots its an altogether fun action packed film
with well directed fight scenes that you’ll enjoy
immensely. There is a bonus scene for the die
hard fans after the credits well worth the wait.
Easily watched without having seen any of the
previous movies its very enjoyable. Most
probably better watched in 2D but I’ve not had a
chance with the 3D yet.

This film was awesome and blows “X-men
Origins Wolverine” out of the water, everything
about this film was amazing, I loved the fight
scenes the one on the Bullet train was brilliant,
so was the one at Yashida’s funeral. One of the
things that made this film so good for me was
how for the most part of the film
Wolverine/Logan (Hugh Jackman) doesn’t have
his power of regeneration so he’s just a mortal
with awesome claws. One thing I wasn’t keen on
with this film was Jean Grey (Famke Janssen)
presence in this film I thought she was stupidly
pointless and if anything brought unnecessary
complexity to the plot. I loved the end credit
scene this just wrapped it up as Logan was
leaving with Yukio (Rila Fukushima) on a plane
and then he’s in an airport in the end credit
scene. The end credit scene has left me feeling
really excited for “Days of Future past” and I
can’t wait for the 23rd of May 2014 to see that.
10/10 Thanks for reading :)

Spoiler
Intensity

.466

<

.972

Human
Votes

0/3

<

3/3
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Table B1. Results of Models Controlling for Intensity from Non-Spoiler Reviews
Homogenous Effect of
Intensity from Spoiler and
Non-Spoiler Reviews

Separate Effects of Intensity
from Spoiler and NonSpoiler Reviews

(1)
.642***
(.017)
-

(2)
.642***
(.017)
.074***
(.015)
-

ln($%&'()*+)!,#$%
ln(&-.*-/&.()!,#$%
ln(&-.*-/&.( &' )!,#$%

.073***
(.016)
-

ln(&-.*-/&.( () )!,#$%
0)10!,#$%
ln(234)%.&-5)!,#$%
ln(234+1')!,#$%
ln(%$+*).)!,#$%
ln(.6*%.*)/)!#
%5* (8)
61'&$%(!#
DAYOFWEEK Dummies
Movie Fixed Effects
Endogeneity Corrections
Cluster-Robust Standard Error
Number of Observations

.058***
(.014)
.128
(.066)
.163***
(.026)
.034***
(.009)
.091***
(.006)
.324***
(.019)
-.007***
(.001)
.532***
(.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

.122*
(.051)
.163***
(.027)
.029**
(.010)
.093***
(.006)
.336***
(.019)
-.007***
(.001)
.532***
(.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
49,057
* < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001.
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C. ESG Issues Monitored by RepRisk
Environment
Animal mistreatment

Social
Child labor

Governance
Anti-competitive practices

Climate change, GHG
emissions, and global pollution

Discrimination in employment

Corruption, bribery, extortion,
money laundering

Impacts on landscapes,
ecosystems, and biodiversity

Forced labor

Executive compensation issues

Local pollution

Freedom of association and
collective bargaining

Fraud

Overuse and wasting of
resources

Human rights abuses, corporate
complicity

Misleading communication

Waste issues

Impacts on communities

Tax evasion

Local participation issues

Tax optimization

Occupational health and safety
issues
Poor employment conditions
Social discrimination
Cross-cutting Issues
Controversial products and services
Products (health and environmental issues)
Supply chain issues
Violation of international standards
Violation of national legislation

Information in this table was obtained from: https://www.reprisk.com/content/static/reprisk-esgissues-definitions.pdf (accessed February 5, 2021).
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